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INTRODUCTION
When, in the name of public safety, the California Supreme
Court imposed upon the mental health professional a duty to warn
potential victims who have been threatened by the therapist's
patient, it touched off a conflict between the requirements of law
and those of sound clinical practice. The Court's ruling in Tarasoff
v. Regents of University of Californiat was met with opposition
from psychiatric and psychological associations who claimed that
the decision interferes with sound clinical practice.2 Opponents
particularly objected to the decision's standard, which is based on
the therapist's ability to predict dangerousness, and to the
1. 13 Cal. 3d 177, 529 P.2d 553, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1974) [Tarasoff 1], vacated, 17 Cal.
3d 425, 440, 551 P.2d 334, 346, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 26 (1976) [Tarasoff 11]. The court's opinion in
TarasoffI has been omitted from publication in California Reports. All references to Tarasoff in this
article will refer to Tarasoff II unless otherwise noted.
2. Motion of American Psychiatric Association, Area IV Assembly of the American
Psychiatric Association, Northern California Psychiatric Society, California State Psychological
Association, San Francisco Psychoanalytic Institute and Society, California Society for Clinical Social
Work, National Association of Social Workers, Golden Gate Chapter, and California Hospital
Association for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief Amicus Curiae in Support of Petition
for Rehearing, Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 13 Cal. 3d 177, 529 P.2d 553, 118 Cal. Rptr.
129 (1974).
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decision's mandate to violate confidentiality under certain
circumstances.3
In view of the contention that the threat of liability curtails
sanctioned conduct, this Article considers whether and how
Tarasoff has affected psychotherapeutic practice.4 Specifically, it
reports on a survey which focuses upon therapists' familiarity with
and understanding of the Tarasoff decision, their ability and
willingness to comply with its requirements, how they have
responded to its prescriptions, and what particular effects the
decision has produced upon their practices.
This study is not the first attempt to discern the effects of
Tarasoff upon psychotherapeutic practice. The national impact5 of
Tarasoff prompted three earlier studies: The Beck Study, the
Wisconsin Study, and the Stanford Study.6 All three studies
concluded that Tarasoff has had widespread effects upon clinical
practice.7  Moreover, they provided additional information
regarding the major criticisms of the Tarasoffdecision--namely, the
inability of psychotherapists to predict potential dangerousness and
the decision's mandate to breach confidentiality! The Wisconsin
study and the Beck study also determined that psychologists and
3. Tarasoff 1, 13 Cal. 3d at 177, 529 P.2d at 553, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
4. See Daniel J. Givelber et al., Tarasoff, Myth and Reality: An Empirical Study of Law in
Action, 1984 Wis. L. REv. 443, 486-87 (1984) [hereinafter The Wisconsin Study] (discussing
evaluation of the practical effects of Tarasoff and citing William B. Schwartz & Neil K. Komesar,
Doctors, Damages and Deterrence, 298 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1282-89 (1978)).
5. Washington, Pennsylvania, Nebraska, and New Jersey courts have acknowledged Tarasoff
in recognizing a limited duty to protect. Petersen v. Washington, 671 P.2d 230 (Wash. 1983); Leedy
v. Hartnett, 510 F. Supp. 1125 (M.D. Pa. 1981); Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185
(D. Neb. 1980); McIntosh v. Milano, 403 A.2d 500 (NJ. 1979).
6. James C. Beck, Violent Patients and the Tarasoff Duty in Private Psychiatric Practice,
13 J. PsycmA'RY & L. 361 (1985) [hereinafter The Beck Study]; The Wisconsin Study, supra, note
4; Toni P. Wise, Where the Public Peril Begins: A Survey of Psychotherapists to Determine the
Effects of Tarasoff, 31 STAN. L. REv. 165 (1978) [hereinafter The Stanford Study].
7. The Beck Study, supra note 6, at 375; The Wisconsin Study, supra note 4, at 447, 485; The
Stanford Study, supra note 6, at 167, 178, 182, 190.
8. See supra notes 4, 6.
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psychiatrists interpret the Tarasoff duty to protect as a duty to warn
the potential victim.'
The present study builds on the work of precursors which were
published eight, nine, and fifteen years ago, respectively."0 Section
I reviews the history of the Tarasoff decisions.11 Section II
examines the legacy of Tarasoff. The role of the special
relationship that exists between therapists and their patients; the
courts' attempts both to narrow and to expand the notion of
foreseeability of the victim; the nature and type of threatened harm;
as well as those to whom the Tarasoff decision applies.12 Section
III then examines the criticisms of the decision, and particularly the
capacity of mental health professionals to predict dangerous
behavior as well as the implications of the decision for the
confidentiality of patient-therapist communications.
Section IV turns to the study itself, in which 872 psycho-
therapists responded to a mail survey which was distributed during
the Spring of 1987. The survey addressed such matters as: The
psychotherapist's understanding of the Tarasoff decision, including
to whom they thought it applied, and what behaviors were required
of the therapist; whether and how the decision had impacted upon
their practice, including the number of dangerous patients they see,
and how many they have turned away; their perception of the
decision's effects on confidentiality, and how they handled matters
of confidentiality in their practice; whether they felt obligated to
warn potential victims of harms other than those arising from
violent injury; as well as a variety of standard demographic
9. See The Wisconsin Study, supra note 4, at 483, 486-87 ("Tarasoff must be evaluated in
terms of its practical impact rather than in terms of the court's assumptions, or critics' predictions
of psychiatric armageddon.... The judicially determined rule of TarasoffI, protect through warning,
appears to have affected therapist attitudes, knowledge and behavior to a far greater degree than
Tarasoff H."); see also William J. Bowers et al., How Did Tarasoff Affect Clinical Practice?, 484
ANNALS AAPSS 70 (1986); accord The Beck Study, supra note 6, at 374. The findings suggest that
Tarasoff must be evaluated as if it requires a warning. The authors of this study have used this
operational definition of reasonable care within the "Tarasoff Survey" document. See infra app. A.
10. The Beck Study, supra note 6; The Wisconsin Study, supra note 4; The Stanford Study,
supra note 6.
11. See infra notes 16-39 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 40-130 and accompanying text.
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issues.1 3 Section V assesses and discusses the results of the
study,14 while Section VI examines its implications. 5
I. THE HISTORY OF THE TARASOFF DECISION
In 1969, Prosenjit Poddar, a graduate student, voluntarily sought
psychiatric counseling at Cowell Memorial Hospital at the
University of California, Berkeley. 6 Dr. Moore, a psychologist at
the university health center, diagnosed Poddar as a potentially
dangerous paranoid schizophrenic. 7 His diagnosis was based
primarily upon evidence of Poddar's intention to purchase a gun
and Poddar's pathological obsession with Tatiana Tarasoff, another
Berkeley student who had previously rebuffed Poddar's expressions
of affection.18 Poddar informed Dr. Moore that he planned to kill
an unnamed woman, identifiable as Tatiana, when she returned
from vacationing in Brazil.' 9 After consulting with psychiatric
colleagues, Dr. Moore sought to have Poddar committed for
observation in a mental hospital. Moore notified the police, orally
and in writing, of Poddar's potential dangerousness and requested
their assistance in securing Poddar's confinement.2" The officers
took Poddar into custody but, satisfied that he did not pose a
danger, released him with a warning to stay away from Tatiana.2
Subsequently, the director of psychiatry at Cowell Memorial
Hospital ordered that all records regarding Poddar's therapy be
destroyed and that no further action be taken to detain him.22
13. See infra notes 131-185 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 186-267 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 268-269 and accompanying text.
16. Tarasoff I, 17 Cal. 3d at 429, 551 P.2d at 339, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 19; People v. Poddar,
10 Cal. 3d 750, 518 P.2d 342, 111 Cal. Rptr. 910 (1974) (the criminal action against Poddar). For
a comprehensive discussion of the facts and circumstances surrounding the Tarasoff case, see Alan
A. Stone, The TarasoffDecisions: Suing Psychotherapists to Safeguard Society, 90 HARv. L. Rnv.
358 (1976) [hereinafter Suing Psychotherapists].
17. Poddar, 10 Cal. 3d at 754, 518 P.2d at 345, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 913.
18. Suing Psychotherapists, supra note 16, at 359.
19. Tarasoff H, 17 Cal. 3d at 432, 551 P.2d at 341, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
20. Suing Psychotherapists, supra note 16, at 359.
21. ki at 360.
22. d; Tarasoff 11, 17 Cal. 3d at 432, 551 P.2d at 341, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
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Poddar did not return for psychological treatment following his
release;23 On October 27, 1969, shortly after Tatiana returned
from Brazil, Poddar fatally shot and stabbed her in her home.24
Tatiana's parents filed suit against the Regents of the University
of California, the psychotherapists who handled Poddar's case, and
the campus police.' The trial court dismissed the complaint for
failure to state a cause of action, and the court of appeals
affirmed.26 The plaintiffs then appealed to the .California Supreme
Court, arguing (1) defendants had a duty to warn Miss Tarasoff or
her family of the danger Poddar posed to her and (2) that
defendants failed to use reasonable care to confine Poddar pursuant
to the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, the California civil commitment
statute.
27
In the first of two decisions, the California Supreme Court
reversed the lower courts.28 In Tarasoff I, the court held that the
defendant psychotherapists had a duty to warn Tatiana of Poddar's
threatened violence.29 This duty was premised on the special
relationship that exists between a psychotherapist and his
patient.3" Additionally, the court held that the defendant policemen
could be liable for failing to warn Miss Tarasoff on the theory that
their "bungled" attempt to detain Poddar inevitably deterred him
from continuing psychotherapy and contributed to the danger
23. Suing Psychotherapists, supra note 16, at 360.
24. Poddar, lOCal. 3d at 754,518 P.2d at 345, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 913. Poddar was convicted
of second degree murder. The original conviction was reversed, however, for failure to instruct the
jury adequately regarding the defense of diminished capacity. Id. at 760-61,518 P.2d at 349-50, 111
Cal. Rptr. at 917-18. Subsequently, Poddar was convicted of voluntary manslaughter, confined to the
Vacaville prison, released, and has since returned to India. Suing Psychotherapists, supra note 16,
at 358.
25. Suing Psychotherapists, supra note 16, at 360.
26. Tarasoffv. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 33 Cal. App. 3d 275,276, 108 Cal. Rptr. 878, 880,
887, vacated and remanded, 13 Cal. 3d 177, 529 P.2d 553, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1974), vacated, 17
Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
27. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 13 Cal. 3d 177, 529 P.2d. 553, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129
(1974) [Tarasoffl], vacated, 17 Cal. 3d 425,551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976); see CAL. WE.u.
& INST. CODE §§ 5000-5404.1 (West 1984 & Supp. 1993) (civil commitment statutes).
28. Tarasoffl, 13 Cal. 3d 177 at , 529 P.2d at 556, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 139.
29. Id. at., 529 P.2d at 555, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 131.
30. Id. at_, 529 P.2d at 558, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
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confronting Tatiana.3" Finally, although the defendants were found
to have a duty to warn, the court concluded that the
psychotherapists and police were immune from liability for failure
to confine Poddar.
3 2
The California Supreme Court's imposition of a duty to warn
in Tarasoff I generated vigorous discussion in legal and
psychological literature.33 Inspired by criticisms raised, defendants
and several amici curiae petitioned the court for reconsideration of
the decision.' In an atypical move, the court granted the
defendant's petition for rehearing.35
Changing its earlier position, the court found no duty to warn
owed by the police.36 Nevertheless, the court again imposed a
duty on psychotherapists.37 In Tarasoff II, however, the
psychotherapists' duty was defined more broadly. Specifically, the
court held that the special relationship which exists between a
therapist and his patient, coupled with the therapist's knowledge
that his patient poses a serious threat of violence to another, gives
rise to an obligation "to use reasonable care to protect the intended
31. Id. at , 529 P.2d at 561, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 137.
32. Id. at ., 529 P.2d at 563-65, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 129-30. The court explained that the
psychotherapists' immunity was based on California Government Code § 856, which provided, in
pertinent part, that public entities and their employees were shielded from liability for "any injury
resulting from determining in accordance with any applicable enactment... whether to confine a
person for mental illness...." ld. The court predicated the immunity of the police on § 5154 of the
California Welfare and Institutions Code, stating "the peace officer responsible for detainment of [a]
person shall not be held civilly or criminally liable for any action by a person released at or before
the end of 72 hours...." Id.; see CAL. GOV'T CODE § 856 (West 1980); CAL. WELP. & INST. CODE
§ 5154 (West 1984 & Supp. 1993).
33. See, e.g., George J. Annas, Law and Psychiatry: When Must the Doctor Warn Others of
the Potential Dangerousness of his Patient's Condition?, MEDIc-LEAL NEws (April 1975); John G.
Fleming & Bruce Maximov, The Patient or His Victim: The Therapist's Dilemma, 62 CAL- L. REV.
1025 (1974); Robert B. Kaplan, Comment, Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California:
Psychotherapists, Policemen and the Duty to Warn-An Unreasonable Extension of the Common
Law? 6 GOLDEN GATE U. L REv. 229 (1975); Dennis W. Daley, Comment, Tarasoff and the
Psychotherapist's Duty to Warn, 12 SAN DiEGo L RFv. 932, 940 (1975).
34. See supra note 2 (citing motion of the American Psychiatric Association et al.).
35. Tarasoff l, 17 Cal. 3d. 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
36. Absent explanation, the court concluded that the police lacked a special relation with
Poddar or Tatiana sufficient to give rise to a duty to warn. Id. at 444, 551 P.2d at 349, 131 Cal. Rptr.
at 29.
37. Id at 436-37, 551 P.2d at 343-44, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23-24.
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victim against such danger."38 Whether the therapist can discharge
this obligation by warning the potential victim, notifying the police,
or performing some other action was to be determined by the
circumstances of the particular case.
39
II. THE LEGACY OF THE TARASOFF DECISION
Much of the controversy surrounding Tarasoff concerned the
circumstances under which the courts should establish a duty, and
where limits to that duty should be drawn.40 The vague
foreseeability standards in Tarasoff and its progeny provided
therapists little guidance by which to consider and formulate their
own behavior. Additionally, recent court decisions have extended
liability beyond the apparent scope of the original Tarasoff
decision.4" Thus, it is important to understand the general tort
principles upon which the therapist's duty to protect potential
victims is founded.42 Generally, the extent of this duty is
measured by the foreseeability of the risk and the size of the
danger created.43 The Tarasoff court considered seven major
factors in deciding whether to recognize a duty of care."
38. Id. at 431, 551 P.2d at 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., Suing Psychotherapists, supra note 16.
41. See infra notes 70-82 and accompanying text (discussing the expansion of Tarasoff in
subsequent cases).
42. See generally W. PAGE KELrON HL AL., PRossER AND KEMTON ON THE LAW 0F ToRTs
(5th ed. 1984).
43. Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928) (cited in Brady v. Hopper,
570 F. Supp. 1333, 1338 (C.D. Colo. 1983) (applying California law by analogy)); Tarasoff 11, 17
Cal. 3d at 434-35, 551 P.2d at 342-43, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 22-23.
44. TarasofffI, 17 Cal. 3d at 434, 551 P.2d at 342, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 22. These seven factors
are: (1) The foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff; (2) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff
suffered injury; (3) the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury
suffered; (4) the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct; (5) the policy preventing future
harm; (6) the extent of the burden to the defendant and the consequences to the community of
imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach; and (7) the availability, cost, and
prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. Id.
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A. The Special Relationship
First, the majority recognized that generally speaking, one
person has no duty to control the conduct of another." However,
a duty to protect a third party exists when the defendant bears a
special relation to the dangerous person or to the third party.46
Courts have carved out an exception to this rule, and the Tarasoff
court decided that the relationship between a therapist and patient
embodies this special relationship. 7 Tarasoff thus imposes upon
therapists an obligation to protect certain third parties, in part, by
virtue of the special relationship which exists between therapists
and their patients.
B. The Foreseeability of the Potential Victim
In addition to the existence of a special relationship, Tarasoff
requires the presence of certain elements of foreseeability in order
to impose a duty to protect. 8 Adopting the language of prior
cases, the majority wrote that, "the defendant owes a duty of care
to all persons who are foreseeably endangered by his conduct
... , Under Tarasoff, the victim must be foreseeable.5"
The court further explained that it would be unreasonable to
require the psychotherapist to interrogate his patient as to conduct,
or carry on an investigation regarding the victim's identity.51 But
45. lad at 435, 551 P.2d at 342-43, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 22-23 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTs § 315-320 (1965)).
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 321-324(a) (1965).
47. TarasoffII, 17 Cal. 3d at 435-36, 551 P.2d at 343-44, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23-24. But see
Robert F. Schopp & Michael R. Quattrocchi, Tarasoff, The Doctrine of Special Relationships, and
the Psychotherapist's Duty to Warn, 12 J. PsYCHiATRY & L. 13, 27-28 (1984) (challenging the
court's determination that the relationship between therapist and patient embodies this special
relationship; also suggesting that the relationship may allow psychotherapists better access to threats,
placing them in a better position to prevent potential harm).
48. TarasoffII, 17 Cal. 3d at 434-35, 551 P.2d at 342, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
49. Id. (citing Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 399, 525 P.2d 669, 680,
115 Cal. Rptr. 765, 776 (1974); Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 739, 441 P.2d 912, 919, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 72, 79 (1968); Weirum v. R.K.O. General, Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 45, 539 P.2d 36, 39, 123 Cal.
Rptr. 468, 471 (1975)).
50. Tarasoff 11, 17 Cal. 3d at 439, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
51. Id. at 439 n.11, 551 P.2d at 345 n.11, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25 n.1l.
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there are occasions when the therapist is able to identify the victim
at a moment's reflection. The court concluded that under such
conditions the victim is sufficiently foreseeable to justify imposing
a duty to warn.52 There really are no "hard and fast" rules that go
into a foreseeability analysis. Rather, foreseeability is dictated by
the circumstances of each case.
In addition to the foreseeable potential victim, it may be
necessary to warn others. The court stated that the exercise of
reasonable care may require the therapist to warn the potential
victim "or those who can reasonably be expected to notify him."53
The opinion does not, however, provide any standards for these
additional warnings.54
In subsequent decisions, the courts have reconsidered and
reinterpreted the definition of foreseeable victim. In Thompson v.
County of Alameda,55 the court determined that the county did not
knowingly place the decedent child into a "foreseeably dangerous
position" when it released a convicted juvenile offender into the
neighborhood.56
The majority distinguished the murdered child in Thompson
from Tatiana in Tarasoff. While Tatiana was a known, specifically
foreseeable and identifiable potential victim, the Thompson child
was not.57 The psychotherapist in Tarasoff could have made one
52. Id.
53. Id. at 442, 551 P.2d at 347, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 27.
54. Subsequent decisions have held that there is no duty to warn the family of a potential
suicide victim. Bellah v. Greenson, 81 Cal. App. 3d 614, 620-21, 146 Cal. Rptr. 535, 539 (1978).
California Evidence Code § 1024 and Welfare and Institutions Code § 5328 allow a therapist to warn
if desired. CAL. Evm. CODE § 1024 (West 1966); CAL. WELF. & INsT. CODE § 5328 (West 1984 &
Supp. 1993). Additionally, there is no duty to warn the police under traditional case law since the
police have no duty either to warn or protect the victim. Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32 Cal.
3d 197, 205, 649 P.2d 894, 898, 185 Cal. Rptr. 252, 256 (1982); Thompson v. County of Alameda,
27 Cal. 3d 741,756, 614 P.2d 728,736, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70,78 (1980); see CAL. WEL. & INST. CODE
§ 5154 (West 1984 & Supp. 1993) (providing civil immunity for peace officers); CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 856 (West 1980) (providing immunity for public entities and employees who detain persons due
to mental illness).
55. 27 Cal. 3d at 753, 614 P.2d at 734, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 76 (holding that the County had no
duty to warn the plaintiff, whose child had been murdered by a recently released juvenile offender,
where the releasee made nonspecific threats against nonspecific victims).
56. Id. at 752-53, 614 P.2d at 733, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
57. Id. at 752, 614 P.2d at 734, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 76.
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simple, effective warning to protect Tatiana, but because the
offender in Thompson did not name a specific victim, the county
psychiatrist could not have made a single warning. Rather, the
county would have had to warn the general public. The court felt
that so broad a warning would not only have been ineffective, but
also prejudicial to the releasee and detrimental to the county
rehabilitation program."
In view of these serious consequences, the Thompson court
declined to impose a duty upon the county psychiatrist except
where the benefits of warning outweigh the costs to the released
offender.59 The court decided that such benefits accrue only when
a narrow group of people are involved; that is when a "named or
readily identifiable victim or group of victims who can be
effectively warned of the danger . . ." are the subject of the
patient's threats.60
Echoing the words of the majority in Tarasoff, the California
Court of Appeals held in Mavroudis v. Superior Court of San
Mateo County,61 that a therapist has a duty to protect a potential
victim who can be identified at a moment's reflection.6' The
Mavroudis court concluded that the duty to protect arises when a
patient threatens a "readily identifiable victim.
63
58. Id. at 755, 757, 614 P.2d at 736, 737, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 78, 79.
59. Id. at 754, 614 P.2d at 735, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
60. Id. at 758, 614 P.2d at 738, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 80 (emphasis added); see Bill v. Superior
Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 1002, 1012-13, 187 Cal. Rptr. 625, 631-33 (1982) (holding producers of a
violent movie have no obligation to protect members of the general public against the anticipated
behaviors of violent patrons). But see Thompson, 27 Cal. 3d at 760, 614 P.2d at 739, 167 Cal. Rptr.
at 81 (Tobriner, J., dissenting) (explicitly arguing that the existence of a readily identifiable victim
is not essential in order to establish a duty of care). It should be noted that the dissent in Thompson
suggested that the defendant owes a duty of care to all foreseeable victims. let Duty is not, according
to Justice Tobriner, founded upon specific foreseeability; rather, it rests on the basic tenet of tort law
that a defendant "owes a duty of care to all persons who are foreseeably endangered by his conduct."
Ie As a result, the victim need not be foreseeable in order to establish a duty. Iat Instead, the
reasonableness of the therapist's behavior is judged by whether a victim was foreseeable to the
therapist at the time the threat was made. let
61. 102 Cal. App. 3d 594, 162 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1980) (upholding a duty of care in an action
wherein petitioners claim that a psychiatrist should have warned them about his patient's potential
dangerousness).
62. Id. at 600, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 729 (citing Tarasoff l, 17 Cal. 3d at 439 n.11, 551 P.2d at
345 n.1l, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25 n.l1).
63. Id at 601, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 730.
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Similarly, in Doyle v. United States,' the district court
declined to uphold a duty to protect because the victim was not
foreseeable and identifiable.65 The court followed Tarasoff and
Thompson, stating that the duty to warn exists only when the
victim is known and foreseeable.66
The Ninth Circuit also narrowly defined foreseeability in Vu v.
Singer.6 7 The Vu court concluded that under California law, the
victim must be "foreseeable and specifically identifiable.
68
According to Vu, a therapist must be able to identify the victim
specifically, or no duty arises.69
In two subsequent decisions, the courts reversed course,
broadening the definition of foreseeable victim. In Jablonski by
Pahls v. United States,7 the potential victim's daughter brought
an action against a psychiatrist alleging that the therapist should
have obtained his patient's past psychiatric records.71 The plaintiff
claimed that, based upon these records, the therapist should have
warned the plaintiff's mother of the patient's homicidal
ideations.7"
The court noted that the patient had not made any threats
against any specific individuals. 73 Nonetheless, the court held that
the unsecured past psychiatric records indicated that the patient
might attack his girlfriend.74 In other words, the victim was
64. 530 F. Supp. 1278 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act where
petitioner claimed that an Army psychiatrist should have warned decedent about a recently discharged
Army serviceman).
65. Id. at 1288; accord Brady v. Hopper, 570 F. Supp. 1333, 1338 (D. Colo. 1983) (noting
that the harm becomes more foreseeable the better known the intended victim becomes).
66. Doyle, 530 F. Supp. at 1288.
67. 706 F.2d 1027 (9th Cir. 1983) (declining to impose a duty of care upon a corporation in
favor of neighborhood residents where company-related job corps members attacked the plaintiff's
decedent at home).
68. Id. at 1029.
69. The concurrence in Vu argues that the existence of a foreseeable victim is not necessary
to impose a duty of care. Id. at 1031-33 (Rothstein, J., concurring); see supra note 60 (providing J.
Tobriner's argument for a duty to care towards all potential victims, even if unnamed).
70. 712 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1983).
71. Jablonski, 712 F.2d at 393.
72. Id. at 398. The patient's past history of violence, of which the therapist was unaware, was
described in the records. Id.
73. Id. at 398.
74. Id. at 398.
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sufficiently foreseeable. The court both recognized that a duty to
protect existed and that the psychiatrist was in breach of duty
because he had failed to act.75 Jablonski thus expanded the
definition of foreseeable victim to include those people who can be
identified through a patient's past psychiatric records.
The California Supreme Court further expanded the duty of care
in Hedlund v. Superior Court of Orange County.76 In Hedlund, a
woman who had been shot by a mental patient claimed that the
attacker's psychiatrist owed a duty of care to her and to her child
who witnessed the shooting.77 At issue was whether a therapist
owes a duty of care to all those who may be injured if the patient
carries out his threat.78 Specifically, is the potential victim's child
a foreseeable victim even though he had not been threatened by the
patient?
The Hedlund court adopted the rationale of the court in Dillon
v. Legg,79 and held that it is not unreasonable to recognize a duty
to foreseeable persons closely related to the subject of a patient's
threat.8" This duty of care does not require the psychotherapist to
protect anyone other than the threatened victim; still, the
psychotherapist is liable to the other foreseeable parties based on
his duty to protect the threatened victim.8 Broadly speaking, by
holding that the therapist becomes liable to all foreseeable persons
who may be injured as a result of the patient's threat, Hedlund
stretched the definition of the foreseeable victim far beyond the
limits originally set by Tarasoff and Thompson. 2
In sum, both Tarasoff and Thompson held that a potential
victim must be foreseeable and readily identifiable.8" The
Mavroudis decision added that the victim must be identifiable upon
75. Id.
76. 34 Cal. 3d 695, 669 P.2d 41, 194 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1983).
77. Hedlund 34 Cal. 3d at 700, 669 P.2d at 42-43, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 807.
78. Id. at 705, 669 P.2d at 46, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 810.
79. 68 Cal. 2d 728,441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968) (holding that a mother may recover
damages for trauma sustained when she watched her son run over by a car).
80. Hedlund, 34 Cal. 3d at 706, 669 P.2d at 47, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 811.
81. Id. at 705 n.7, 669 P.2d at 46 n.7, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 810 n.7.
82. See supra notes 48-60 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 48-60 and accompanying text.
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a moment's reflection. 4 Doyle and Brady further held that the
victim should be known and foreseeable." Finally, Vu stated that
the victim should be known and specifically identifiable.8 6 These
decisions narrowed the scope of foreseeability.
Meanwhile, Jablonski and Hedlund reversed the trend towards
narrowly defining foreseeable victim. The Jablonski decision
created uncertainty regarding how far courts may reach in order to
determine that the victim is foreseeable. Jablonski held that the
psychiatrist has a duty to protect those individuals who can be
identified from past records, in addition to those who can be
identified in a personal interview with the patient.87 The Jablonski
court found that the psychiatrist should have located and examined
prior records of violent behavior and hospitalization. After
Jablonski, it was difficult for the psychotherapist to tell who or
what she must consult in order to make her determination.
Next, the court in Hedlund expanded the duty of care to
encompass a group of individuals entirely separate from the
threatened victim: Those who are likely to be in the care and
presence of the victim.88 The identifiability of this new class of
persons to whom a duty is owed depends upon the foreseeability
of the original potential victim and upon whether this second class
is foreseeable.89 Again, because the definition of foreseeability is
vague, it is difficult to determine to whom the therapist may be
liable under Hedlund.
Relevant case law thus provides that in order to impose a duty
of care upon psychotherapists, the potential victim must be
somewhat identifiable. In view of the various standards discussed
above, it is difficult to determine just how identifiable a potential
84. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
85. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
87. Jablonski by Pahls v. United States, 712 F.2d 391, 393 (9th Cir. 1983); see supra notes
70-75 and accompanying text (discussing the Jablonski decision).
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victim must be, since the courts have refused to furnish a workable
definition of "readily" or "specifically identifiable."
C. A Serious Threat
In addition to the existence of a special relationship and a
foreseeable victim, Tarasoff held that the patient must direct a
serious threat of harm against the potential victim for a duty to
protect to arise.' Specifically, the majority opinion required that
the patient pose a "serious danger of violence" to others.9 1 Other
courts have generally followed this decision; however, they still
struggle to define what constitutes a "serious threat of harm." The
courts reason that a therapist's duty of care arises when there is a
foreseeable risk of danger to a foreseeable victim.92 The threats
made against a potential victim must be serious enough to
constitute this foreseeable danger.93
Recognizing that patients often make meaningless threats during
therapy, the California Supreme Court in Thompson commented
that a therapist is duty-bound only when a patient poses a "serious
danger of violence to others." 94 A casual or nonspecific threat of
harm, directed at a nonspecific victim, is not enough to impose a
duty upon public entities.9 Nor do group statistics indicating that
a released inmate may kill again constitute a threat of violence
from a member of that group.9 6 Instead, the Thompson court held
that a releasing agent is liable for failure to protect only when a
released person makes a predictable threat of harm to a named or
readily identifiable victim.97
90. Tarasoff l, 17 Cal. 3d at 439, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
91. Id.
92. Molsbergen v. United States, 757 F.2d 1016, 1022-23 (9th Cir. 1985).
93. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928); Doyle v. United States,
530 F. Supp. 1278, 1287 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
94. Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d 741,752, 614 P.2d 728, 734, 167 Cal. Rptr.
70, 76 (1980) (citing Tarasofff1, 17 Cal.3d at 439, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25).
95. Thompson, 27 Cal. 3d at 754, 614 P.2d at 735, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 77.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 758, 614 P.2d at 738, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
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The court in Mavroudis added that the threat must be intended
to be carried out in the immediate future.98 The court held that a
duty arises when a "patient presents a serious and imminent danger
of violence. . . ."99 The court in Brady v. Hopper additionally
noted that the threat must be verbalized and directed at an
identifiable victim."°
The Ninth Circuit seems to have elaborated and expanded the
seriousness requirement in Jablonski. The patient in Jablonski made
no clear, specific threat against the potential victim.'
Nonetheless, the court found that a duty existed because the
psychiatrist should have secured and scrutinized the patient's past
psychiatric records.' ° Had he done so, he would have learned
that Jablonski had raped his previous wife and had committed other
acts of violence against her. The court concluded it would have
been easy to infer from these records a present and serious threat
of danger.'0 3
Jablonski further complicated the meaning of threat by
imposing a duty where the patient does not articulate a threat." 4
The Jablonski court inferred both the existence of the threat and
the seriousness of its character from a source other than the
patient."5 It is questionable whether evidence of violence from
prior history uniformly constitutes the serious foreseeable risk of
harm contemplated by the court in Tarasoff. Depending upon the
nature and quality of the records, it is easy to imagine situations
where the imposition of a duty would be unwarranted. Thus, the
result in Jablonski may allow other courts to infer seriousness
perhaps from vague references in past records and pronounce a
duty on the basis of hindsight.
98. Mavroudis v. Superior Court, 102 Cal. App. 3d 594, 162 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1980).
99. Id. at 601, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 730.
100. Brady v. Hopper, 570 F. Supp. 1333, 1338 (D. Colo. 1983).
101. Jablonskd by Pahls v. United States, 712 F.2d 391, 398 (9th Cir. 1983).
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In sum, case law provides that in order to impose a duty to
protect, the patient must make a sufficiently serious threat.
Unfortunately, the courts have failed to define the contextual
parameters of seriousness. It remains unclear whether seriousness
is defined as the likelihood that a threat will be carried out or the
severity of the danger. As a result, it is difficult for the therapist to
determine exactly how serious a threat must be which would
require him to act.
D. The Type of Harm Threatened
Another issue which arises concerns the type of harm which the
patient threatens. The court in Bellah v. Greenson16 interpreted
Tarasoff as applying to threats of personal injury directed against
third parties. 7 The Bellah court explained that Tarasoff is
founded upon the public policy of protecting potential victims from
violent assault.0 8 The Bellah court decided that disclosure is not
mandatory in cases involving self-inflicted harm, suicide, or
property damage."° Thus, only where physical injury is the type
of harm threatened does a duty to warn the foreseeable victim
arise.11
0
E. To Whom the Decision Applies
Finally, the court in Tarasoff did not explicitly state to whom
the holding of the decision applies."' While the Tarasoff case
involved two psychiatrists and a psychologist," 2 many other
mental health professionals provide some form of psychological
counseling. Social workers, guidance counselors, occupational
a
106. 81 Cal. App. 3d 614, 146 Cal. Rptr. 535 (1978).
107. Bellah 81 Cal. App. 3d at 620-22, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 539-40 (deciding that a therapist is
under no duty to protect a suicidal patient by warning her parents).
108. Id. at 621-22, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 539-40.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Tarasoff 11, 17 Cal. 3d at 436, 551 P.2d at 343, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
112. L. at 430, 551 P.2d at 349-40, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 19-20.
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therapists, marriage and family counselors and psychiatric nurses,
for example, could all be said to engage in therapy with their
patients or clients." 3 Although several cases have documented the
application of the Tarasoff duty to psychiatrists and
psychologists,1 whether the duty applies to other mental health
workers under common law remains unclear.1 15
F. California Civil Code Section 43.92
As the above discussion illustrates, there is considerable
ambiguity surrounding the interpretation and application of the
Tarasoff decision. In 1984, the California State Psychological
Institute contended that the psychotherapeutic community needed
succinct and specific language to replace the inadequate guidance
provided by the then existing case law. 6 In response to requests
of mental health professionals for reasonable boundaries in an area
of uncertain liability,' 17 Governor Deukmejian and the California
113. Suing Psychotherapists, supra note 16, at 359.
114. See, e.g., TarasoffIl, 17 Cal. 3d 425,551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (application of duty
to psychiatrists and a psychologist); Hedlund v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 3d 695, 669 P.2d 41, 194
Cal. Rptr. 805 (1983) (two psychologists held to owe a duty under Tarasoft); Jablonski by Pahls v.
United States, 712 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1983) (duty owed by a psychiatrist).
115. The issue of whether a duty to warn and protect applies to parties other than mental health
professionals has also been raised. Courts have been reluctant to impose a Tarasoffduty on the police
absent a promise to warn or protect a third party from harm. See, e.g., Davidson v. City of
Westminster, 32 Cal. 3d 197, 649 P.2d 894, 185 Cal. Rptr. 252 (1982) (holding that there was no
special relationship sufficient to establish a duty by the police to warn the victim of potential harm
where police conducted a stakeout of a laundromat to apprehend a man who stabbed several women
in laundromats on prior occasions and, during the stakeout, the victim entered the laundromat and
was murdered by the suspect); cf Morgan v. County of Yuba, 230 Cal. App. 2d 938, 41 Cal. Rptr.
508 (1964) (holding police had a duty to warn due to woman's dependence on the police's promise
to warn the woman when the man who threatened her was released; police failed to do so and woman
was killed). For a discussion of whether attorneys or clergymen could be held liable under Tarasoff,
see Marc L. Sands, The Attorney's Affirmative Duty to Warn Foreseeable fictims of a Client's
Intended ViolentAssault, 21 ToRT & INs. LJ. 355 (1986); Jacob M. Yellin, The History and Current
Status of the Clergy-Penitent Privilege, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 95, 142-48 (1983).
116. See Hearing on A.B. 2900 Before the Senate Comm. on JucL, Cal. Leg. Reg. Sess. (1983-
1984) (statement of California State Psychological Institute at hearing attended by Leslie Small,
author of Psychotherapists' Duty to Warn: Ten Years After Tarasoff, 15 GoLDEN GATE U. L. REV.
271, 294 (1985)).
117. See Small, supra note 116, at 292-94 (discussing critics' contention that Tarasoffdoes not
provide adequate standards for determining liability).
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Legislature enacted section 43.92 of the California Civil Code. n 8
Section 43.92, which became effective January 1, 1986, provides
that when the patient has made a serious threat against an
identifiable victim, the therapist is obligated to warn and protect by
communicating the threat to the victim and to a law enforcement
agency.
n9
Section 43.92 clarifies the psychotherapist's duty to third parties
and the ways in which this duty may be discharged. First, the code
defines the class of psychological counselors owing a duty to
potential victims by referring to the definition of psychotherapist
in California Evidence Code section 1010.120 Second, the
psychotherapist's liability is limited by statute to situations
involving actual knowledge of potential violence.'21 The patient
must communicate a serious threat to his therapist before a duty to
warn and protect is imposed. In requiring that the therapist's patient
articulate a threat of violence before a duty arises, section 43.92
appears to overturn Jablonski's ruling that an actual threat need not
be disclosed.' Third, the statute seems to reaffirm the holding
in Bellah by specifying the category of threats which establish the
psychotherapist's duty.'23 Serious threats of physical violence as
118. CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.92 (West Supp. 1993). The statute provides:
(a) There shall be no monetary liability on the part of, and no cause of action shall arise
against any person who is a psychotherapist as defined in section 1010 of the Evidence
Code in failing to warn of and protect from a patient's violent behavior except where the
patient has communicated to the psychotherapist a serious threat of physical violence
against a readily identifiable victim or victims.
(b) If there is a duty to warn and protect under the limited circumstances specified above,
the duty shall be discharged by the psychotherapist making reasonable efforts to
communicate the threat to the victim or victims and to a law enforcement agency.
Id. (emphasis added).
119. Ld.
120. CAL. EVwD. CODE § 1010(a) (West Supp. 1993). Section 1010 provides that a
psychotherapist is:
(a) A person authorized, or reasonably believed by the patient to be authorized, to practice
medicine in any state or nation who devotes, or is reasonably believed by the patient to
devote, a substantial portion of his or her time to the practice of psychiatry.
Id. The statute's definition of psychotherapist includes a psychologist, clinical social worker, school
psychologist, and marriage, family and child counselor as well. See id § 1010(b)-(e).
121. CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.92(a) (West Supp. 1993).
122. See id.; Jablonski by Pahls v. United States, 712 F.2d 391, 398 (9th Cir. 1983).
123. CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.92(a) (West Supp. 1993); Bellah v. Greenson, 81 Cal. App. 3d. 614,
621-22, 146 Cal. Rptr. 535, 539-40 (1978).
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opposed to threats of suicide or property damage form the basis of
the therapist's duty to warn third parties. 24
In addition, the statute defines psychotherapists' duty more
clearly. Specifically, the statute imposes a duty on the
psychotherapist to warn and protect potential victims from harm.
Yet, although section 43.92 provides, in broad language similar to
Tarasoff II, that the psychotherapist must protect a potential
victim,'2 5 the means by which he is obligated to do so is
reminiscent of the duty enunciated in TarasoffL 1'26 Subsection (b)
of the statute explicitly states that the psychotherapist's duty will
be discharged by reasonable attempts to notify the potential victims
and the police, thus reflecting the duty to warn imposed in Tarasoff
"127 Finally, the particular parties the therapist must attempt to
apprise of potential danger is specified in subsection (b) of the
code. 128
Although section 43.92 clarifies the psychotherapist's duty to
some extent, many issues remain unresolved. The statute provides
no content for such critical terms as "serious threat," "reasonably
identifiable victim," and "reasonable efforts to communicate" a
threat. Nor does the statute address the extent of the psycho-
therapist's potential liability for failure to warn. Section 43.92
places no limitations on the application of common law rules for
determining the proximate damages for breach of duty. Therefore,
the traditional "foreseeable injury" principles applied in Hedlund
apparently still control.'29
California Civil Code section 43.92 clarifies much of the
ambiguity in the prior case law, while leaving some issues open to
interpretation. Whether the statute strikes the proper balance
124. CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.92(a) (West Supp. 1993). The argument could be made that threats
of physical violence "against a reasonably identifiable victim" encompasses potential suicide threats.
The authors feel, however, that the statute will not be interpreted in this manner.
125. Tarasoffff, 17 Cal. 3d at 431, 551 P.2d at 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
126. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 13 Cal. 3d 177,_, 529 P.2d 553, 561, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 129, 137 (1974), vacated, Tarasoffff, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
127. See supra note 118 (providing text of § 43.92).
128. Id.
129. Hedlund v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 3d 695,705,669 P.2d 41,46, 194 Cal. Rptr. 805,810
(1983).
1184
1993 / Ripple Effects of Tarasoff
between providing adequate professional guidance and being suffi-
ciently broad to apply to varying factual circumstances remains to
be seen. At present, the court has interpreted section 43.92 strictly
to require strong evidence from an assailant's prior behavior that
an assault was likely to occur.
130
Ill. CRmCISMS OF THE TARASOFF DECISION
A. Problems Predicting Potential Dangerousness
The question of whether foreseeable harm exists in a particular
case depends upon the presence of potential dangerousness in the
patient.13 ' Liability under Tarasoff, its progeny, and California
Civil Code section 43.92 is premised upon the therapist's ability to
identify potential dangerousness in patients. 132 The Tarasoff court
adopted a standard of liability which requires the therapist to
exercise the reasonable degree of skill, knowledge, and care
ordinarily possessed and exercised by members of the professional
or specialty, under similar circumstances, in determining the mental
status of the patient.'33
This standard presents four serious problems. First, it has been
widely argued that therapists are poor predictors of potential
dangerousness.' In fact, psychological literature indicates that
130. Barry v. Turek, 218 Cal. App. 3d 1241, 1246, 267 Cal. Rptr. 553, 555-56 (1990).
131. Tarasoff.11, 17 Cal. 3d at 437-38, 551 P.2d at 343-444, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 24-25; Hedlund,
34 Cal. 3d at 703, 669 P.2d at 45, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 809.
132. Tarasoffil, 17 Cal. 3d at 438,551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25 (citing various cases).
133. See id. at 451,551 P.2d at 354, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 34 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting)
(citing People v. Burnick, 14 Cal. 3d 306, 535 P.2d 352, 121 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1975)); Hedlund, 34
Cal. 3d at 707-708, 669 P.2d at 48, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 812 (Mosk, J., dissenting). But see Tarasoff I,
17 Cal. 3d at 438, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25 (arguing that because psychological
prediction is analogous to other medical diagnoses, a doctor should be held to a particular
professional standard of care, additionally contending that the community standard mitigates
prediction problems, obviating the need for perfect accuracy, and dismissing the prediction problem
by adding that the therapists in this case had already predicted that Poddar would kill).
134. David T. Simpson Jr., Note, Involuntary Civil Commitment: The Dangerousness Standard
and its Problems, 63 N.C. L. REv. 241, 249 (1984); Schopp & Quattrocchi, supra note 47, at 23;
Howard Gurevitz, Tarasoff: Protective Privilege Versus Public Peril, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 289,
292 (1977); Bernard L. Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 U. PA. L. REv.
439, 447, 451 (1974) (stating that evidence of failure to predict accurately is unequivocal); CLImNCAL
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therapists have difficulty diagnosing mental illness in general, and
that the context in which an individual is found may influence
professional perceptions more than the individual's behavior
itself.135 Predicting dangerousness based on uncertain diagnoses
and poorly recognized contexts further challenges the psycho-
therapist. 13
6
Several empirical studies demonstrate that psychotherapists are
poor predictors of future violent behavior.137 In part, the problem
arises because there is no accepted definition of dangerousness. 138
Moreover, it is virtually impossible to predict the occurrence of
dangerous behavior because dangerous behavior is such an
infrequent event. 139  The literature concludes that across all
circumstances, predicting dangerousness is difficult at best, and that
predicting accurately is virtually impossible.140
ASPECTS Op THE VIoLENT INDIvIDUAL 28 (Am. Psych. Ass'n Task Force Report 1974) [hereinafter
Task Force Report] (stating that no physical expertise in predicting dangerousness has been
developed); Bruce J. Ennis & Thomas R. Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise:
Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CAL L. REv. 693, 696, 734, 752 (1974) (stating that there is
no evidence to suggest that psychiatrists are better than anyone else in predicting dangerousness and
that prediction is impossible); Fleming & Maximov, supra note 33, at 1045; BRUCE J. ENNIS,
PRIsoNERs oF PSYCHIATRY: MENTAL PATIENTS, PSYCHIATRISTS, AND THE LAw 227 (1972 , (stating
that psychiatrists are more often wrong than right in predicting potential dangerousness). But see J.
Monahan, Mental Disorder and Violent Behavior, 47 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 511, 521 (1992) (for
changing view that violence and mental disorder are related).
135. David Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane Places, 179 SCIENCE 250,258 (1973); Stephen
J. Morse, A Preference for Liberty: The Case Against Involuntary Commitment of the Mentally
Disordered, 70 CAL. L. REv. 54,58 n.14 (1982).
136. Some critics argue, however, that dangerousness is difficult to assess precisely because
it does not correspond with any particular diagnosis. See, e.g., Schopp & Quattrocchi, supra note 47,
at 32.
137. Joseph J. Cocozza & Henry J. Steadman, The Failure of Psychiatric Predictions of
Dangerousness: Clear and Convincing Evidence, 29 RuTERs L. REV. 1084, 1099 (1976); Henry J.
Steadman & Joseph J. Cocozza, Selective Reporting and the Public's Misconceptions of the
Criminally Insane, 41 PUBLIC OPINION Q. 523, 533 (1978).
138. Fleming & Maximov, supra note 33, at 1068.
139. Id. at 1061.
140. Recent evidence, however, suggests that while predicting dangerous behavior is clearly
a difficult matter, there are circumstances when it can be predicted better than others. Thus, there is
evidence that the incidence of violent behavior among those who meet the criteria for diagnosis of
bipolar disorder, major depression, or schizophrenia is more than five times higher than it is for those
with no disorder. And for those who have been diagnosed with drug or alcohol abuse/dependence,
the incidence of violent behavior is 12-15 times higher than it is for those without disorders. J.
Swanson et al., Violence and Psychiatric Disorder in the Community: Evidence from the
Epidemiologic Catchment Area Surveys, 41 HOSP. & CoMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 761, 770 (1990).
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Second, therapists' failure to predict dangerousness has several
important consequences. The psychological literature indicates that
therapists are more likely to label healthy patients as dangerous
than to label dangerous patients as healthy."' These false
positives may translate into frequent unwarranted warnings.
Psychotherapists also face the problem of deciding when to take
protective measures. Psychiatric patients routinely make threatening
statements during the course of therapy. 42 The psychotherapist
must determine which, if any, of these statements are evidence of
potential dangerousness of the caliber contemplated by Tarasoff
and the subsequent case law.
Because the costs to the psychotherapist of ignoring a loaded
threat are large, psychotherapists may well err on the side of
overpredicting dangerousness.143 Therapists will necessarily make
more improper warnings based on their inaccurate predictions. 44
Additionally, because of their inability to predict and their fear of
Tarasoff liability, they may overcommit patients to mental
hospitals. "'
Overprediction and subsequent warnings hurt both patient and
psychotherapist. One critic writes that once a therapist warns a
Moreover, evidence from other sources indicates that those who are actively experiencing symptoms
which indicate serious psychological disturbance are involved in violent behavior much more
frequently than nondisordered members of the general population. B. Link et. al., Violent and Illegal
Behavior of Current and Former Mental Patients Compared to Community Controls, AM. Soc. REv.
(publication forthcoming). Thus, it seems fair to conclude that there is a relationship between active
mental disorder and the propensity to violence. As one commentator observes, however, the
relationship while significant, is modest-sufficient that psychotherapists ought to attend to it, but not
so robust that one can expect accurate prediction under most circumstances. J. Monahan, Mental
Disorder and Violent Behavior: Perceptions and Evidence, 47 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 511,521 (1992).
In this regard, it is worth noting that the Wisconsin Study concluded that 75% of their respondents
nationally, and in all psychiatric professions they surveyed, indicated that they could make probable
to certain dangerousness predictions. The Wisconsin Study, supra note 4, at 463.
141. Task Force Report, supra note 134, at 325-27; Ennis & Litwack, supra note 134, at 696;
Rosenhan, supra note 135, at 385.
142. Tarasoff I, 17 Cal. 3d at 441, 551 P.2d at 347, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 27; Ennis & Litwack,
supra note 134, at 711.
143. Schopp & Quattrocchi, supra note 47, at 29.
144. C. J. Meyers, The Legal Perils of Psychotherapeutic Practice (Part II): Coping with
Hedlund and Jablonski, 12 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 39, 45 (1984); Diamond, supra note 134, at 447.
145. Tarasoffll, 17 Cal. 3d at 461-62,551 P.2d at 360-62, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 40-41 (Clark, J.,
dissenting).
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potential victim, he invariably antagonizes and ultimately loses the
patient. 14 6 Patients may also bring actions against therapists for
breaches of privacy and confidentiality, defamation, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. 47 Psychotherapists additionally
risk being sued for treble damages for unauthorized knowing and
willful breaches of confidentiality under the California Welfare and
Institutions Code.148
There is also evidence that concern over whether therapists can
accurately predict dangerousness results in psychotherapists
avoiding potentially dangerous patients.'49 As a result, patients
who are in great need of psychological care are denied treatment.
Dangerous patients remain untreated and may commit more violent
acts than if psychotherapists were under no Tarasoff duty and were,
thus, willing to treat all those in need. 150
Third, imposing a duty on psychotherapists may impede their
ability to treat patients."' Therapists may concentrate so focally
upon diagnosing whether the patient is dangerous for Tarasoff
purposes that they may inadvertently reduce the effort spent on
treating the patient. Patients thus denied valuable care may become
violent, circumventing the positive effect of the law.'52
146. Meyers, supra note 144, at 43.
147. Schaffer v. Spicer, 215 N.W.2d 134, 138 (S.D. 1974) (allowing a medical practitioner to
be held liable in damages to patients for unauthorized disclosure). But see MacDonald v. Clinger, 84
A.D.2d 482, 487 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (allowing a defense for breach when patient presents a
danger to self or others).
148. CAL. Wm.F. & INST. CODE §§ 5328, 5330 (West 1984 & Supp. 1993). Section 5328(r)
authorizes the therapist to release information where a patient is dangerous to himself or others. Id.
§ 5328(r). If a therapist incorrectly assesses the patient as dangerous to himself or others, then the
disclosure of information becomes unauthorized. Section 5330 creates a cause of action for treble
damages when the unauthorized breach of confidentiality is willful and knowing. Id. § 5330.
149. Meyers, supra note 144, at 44.
150. See James C. Beck, Violent Patients and the Tarasoff Duty in Private Psychiatric Practice,
13 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 361, 362 (1985) (noting critics' contentions that the Tarasoff decision does
not adequately protect the public).
151. See generally Paul S. Appelbaum, Implications of Tarasofffor Clinical Practice in the
Violent Patient, in JAMEs C. BECK, THE TARASOFF DECISION AND PSYCHIATRIC PRACTICE 109
(1985).
152. Suing Psychotherapists, supra note 16, at 362. Lest this concern seem mere hyperbole,
the court in Hedlund pointed out that "a negligent failure to diagnose dangerousness in a Tarasoff
action is as much a basis for liability as is a negligent failure to warn." Hedlund v. Superior Court,
34 Cal. 3d 695, 703, 669 P.2d 41, 45, 164 Cal. Rptr. 809, 808 (1983).
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Fourth, considering the inability (or in light of recent evidence,
the quite modest ability) of psychotherapists to predict potential
dangerousness, critics argue that Tarasoff holds therapists to an ill-
defined community standard. 53 Under Tarasoff, a therapist has
a duty to protect a potential victim if he decides or should have
decided that the patient is potentially dangerous.15 Determining
whether the therapist should have diagnosed the patient as
dangerous is problematic because the standard depends upon
agreement in the mental health community. 55 If psychotherapists
as a group can only weakly and imprecisely predict future danger-
ousness, then there can be no criteria against which to judge
therapists' actions. Although the Tarasoff court cautioned against
using hindsight to determine negligence on the part of the
therapist,156 it provided little other than hindsight for making that
determination.
Thus, the fact that violence is, at best, only weakly associated
with mental illness creates serious problems for the law and for
clinicians. In the first place, no widely accepted definition of
dangerousness exists. Moreover, regardless of definition, violent
behavior is a relatively rare event, and rare events are by their
nature difficult to predict. The tort liability to which psycho-
therapists are exposed encourages them to overpredict danger-
ousness. Such an increase in the incidence of false positives
translates both into avoiding dangerous patients and, when they are
not avoided, into many unwarranted warnings. In the face of such
ambiguity, when should psychotherapists take protective measures?
Indeed, given the ambiguities of prediction, psychotherapists may
well attempt to cut anticipated losses by attending carefully to the
diagnostic (and prognostic) matters of dangerousness, rather than
actually treating those who require treatment.
153. Hedlund, 34 Cal. 3d at 709, 669 P.2d at 49, 194 Cal. Rptr. at 813 (Mosk, J., dissenting);
TarasoffIl, 17 Cal. 3d at 460-63, 551 P.2d at 360-62, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 40-42 (Clark, J., dissenting);
John C. George, Hedlund Paranoia, 41 J. CLINICAL PSYCH. 291, 292 (1985).
154. Tarasoff 11, 17 Cal. 3d at 431, 551 P.2d at 343-44, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23-24 (emphasis
added).
155. Id, at 462, 551 P.2d at 361, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 41 (Clark, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 438, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
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B. Confidentiality and the Psychotherapeutic Alliance
While the matter of prediction seems both dire and
exceedingly difficult, the effects of Tarasoff II on confidentiality
are no less so. In what is perhaps the most widely cited phrase in
the Tarasoff opinion, Justice Tobriner made clear that "[t]he
protective privilege ends where the public peril begins."'57
Confidentiality has long been regarded as the cornerstone of the
psychotherapeutic alliance. 158 The establishment of trust between
a patient and his doctor is viewed as a fundamental aspect of
clinical practice. 15' The sanctity of confidentiality has been
embodied in statutes and in the ethical dictates of the medical and
psychological professions.' 60 Thus, the Principles of Medical
Ethics of the American Medical Association (A.M.A.) provide:
"[A] physician may not reveal the confidence entrusted to him in
the course of medical attendance. . . .161 The idea of
confidentiality, however, is not sacrosanct. The confidentiality
mandate is suspended in particular circumstances.162 For example,
A.M.A. ethical principle section 9 allows a doctor to reveal
confidential communications when he or she is required to by law,
or where it becomes necessary in order to protect the welfare of the
individual or the community.' 63 Similarly, California Evidence
Code section 1024 declares that there is no privilege of
confidentiality where the psychotherapist reasonably believes that
the patient's mental or emotional condition poses a danger to
himself or to the person or property of another." Under such
circumstances, disclosure is necessary to prevent the threatened
157. Id. at 442, 551 P.2d at 347, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 27.
158. Louis Everstine et al., Privacy & Confidentiality in Psychotherapy, 35 AM. PsYCHOLOGIST
828, 836 (1980).
159. William 0. Faustman et al., Considerations in Prewarning Clients of the Limitations of
Confidentialty, 60 PsYcH. REPS. 195, 195 (1987).
160. See, e.g., CAL. EvlD. CODE § 1014 (West 1966 & Supp. 1993) (psychotherapist-patient
privilege); AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETIcs § 9 (1959) (applying
to all physicians, including psychiatrists) [hereinafter A.M.A. § 9].
161. A.M.A. § 9, supra note 160.
162. See The Stanford Study, supra note 6, at 165-66.
163. A.M.A. § 9, supra note 160.
164. CAL EVID. CODE § 1024 (West 1966).
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harm. These pre-existing exceptions to both the psychotherapist-
patient evidentiary privilege and the ethical mandate to maintain
confidentiality formed the basis of the California Supreme Court's
formulation of the legal duty to protect in Tarasoff.'6 5
However, several detrimental effects of requiring psycho-
therapists to breach confidentiality have been noted. First, without
a guarantee of confidentiality, people may be deterred from seeking
psychological help." It is well recognized that in our society a
stigma frequently attaches to persons undergoing psychological
counseling.167 The fear of such stigma inhibits people from
consulting mental health professionals for their psychological
problems.168 While the psychotherapist's assurances to preserve
confidentiality alleviates this reluctance, limitations on the
therapist's ability to guarantee confidentiality may rekindle fears of
stigmatization and cause persons to avoid needed psychological
treatment. 6 9 Second, once treatment has begun, complete candid-
ness and disclosure of information is necessary for effective
psychological counseling. 7 ' Psychotherapists maintain that the
therapist-patient relationship depends on the patient's uninhibited
discussion and voluntary revelation of personal and sensitive
material.' 7 ' Without the psychotherapist's assurance of confi-
dentiality, the patient's conscious and unconscious inhibitions may
deter him from expressing his innermost thoughts.'72
165. Tarasoff 1I, 17 Cal. 3d at 441-42, 551 P.2d at 347-48, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 27-28.
166. Id at 458-59, 551 P.2d at 359, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 39 (Clark, J., dissenting) (citing Ralph
Slovenko, Psychiatry and a Second Look at the Medical Privilege, 6 WAYNE L. RE v. 175, 187-88
(1960)).
167. TarasoffII, 17 Cal. 3d at 459,551 P.2d at 359, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 39 (Clark, J., dissenting).
168. Id.; see Robert M. Fisher, The Psychotherapeutic Professions and the Law of Privileged
Communications, 10 WAYNE L. REy. 609, 617 (1964); Slovenko, supra note 166, at 188.
169. Tarasoffl, 17 Cal. 3d at 459,551 P.2d at 359,131 Cal. Rptr. at 39 (Clark, J., dissenting).
170. Id.
171. Suing Psychotherapists, supra note 16, at 366. There is little empirical evidence to support
this contention. A study conducted to evaluate the impact of informed consent procedures on response
rates and response quality in social survey research, however, found that assurances of confidentiality
had a small but significant effect on participants' willingness to respond. Furthermore, there was
some suggestion that guaranteeing confidentiality enhances the quality of answers to questions on
sensitive issues. Eleanor Singer, Informed Consent: Consequences for Response Rate and Response
Quality in Social Surveys, 43 AM. Soc. REV. 144, 150-51 (1978).
172. Tarasoffil, 17 Cal. 3d at 459,551 P.2d at359, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 39 (Clark, J., dissenting).
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Third, even if a patient is not deterred from full disclosure, the
potential for a breach of confidentiality may still erode his trust in
the therapist to such a degree as to hinder the possibility of
successful treatment. Establishing a trusting relationship is
considered a fundamental aspect of effective psychotherapy: "The
essence of much psychotherapy is the construction of trust in the
external world and ultimately in the self, modelled upon the
trusting relationship established during therapy. ' 173 Thus, if the
trust between the therapist and patient is not developed because of
the potential revelation of confidential communications to outside
parties, the likelihood of achieving success in therapy may be
frustrated. 174
Some critics contend that the cumulative impact of these
countertherapeutic effects will circumvent the intent of the Tarasoff
decision. 75 They argue that imposing a duty to warn third parties
may actually increase the likelihood of violent attacks on third
parties by decreasing the number of people who receive effective
psychological care or even any care at all. 176 One commentator
predicted "the imposition of a duty to protect, which may take the
form of a duty to warn threatened third parties, will imperil the
psychotherapeutic alliance and destroy the patient's expectation of
173. Id. at 460, 551 P.2d at 359, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 39 (Clark, J., dissenting) (citing Donald J.
Dawidoff, The Malpractice of Psychiatrists, 1966 DuKE LJ. 696, 704 (1966)); see Everstine et al.,
supra note 158, at 836.
174. Tarasoff l, 17 Cal. 3d at 460, 551 P.2d at 359-60, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 39-40 (Clark, J.,
dissenting). Some commentators contend that applying the Tarasoffduty in a clinical setting can
produce therapeutic benefits for patients. Specifically, they argue that involving the patient in the
warning process: (1) Allows the patient in therapy to focus on his relationship with the potential
victim, and (2) allows the patient to observe the therapist apply a verbal solution to a potentially
violent situation. See David Wexler, Patients, Therapists and Third Parties: The Victimological
irtues of Tarasoff, 2 INT'L J. PSYCHIATRY 1, 128 (1979); Lawson R. Wulsin et al., Unexpected
Clinical Features of the Tarasoff Decision: The Therapeutic Alliance and the "Duty to Warn," 140
AM. J. PsycmATRY 601, 606 (1983).
175. See generally C. J. Meyers, Hard Cases: The "Duty to Warn" As a Felt Necessity of Our
Time, 15 J. PsYcMATRY & L. 189 (1987); Suing Psychotherapists, supra note 16; Everstine ct al.,
supra note 158.
176. Tarasoff l, 17 Cal. 3d at 462,551 P.2d at 361, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 41 (Clark, J., dissenting);
Faustman & Miller, supra note 159, at 198.
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confidentiality, thereby thwarting effective treatment and ultimately
reducing public safety.""'
The court in Tarasoff succinctly dismissed all these
objections. 7 ' It concluded that the public policy protecting
confidential communications between patient and therapist must
yield where necessary to avoid danger to potential victims. But one
suspects that the court did not fully anticipate how destructive
increasingly expansive interpretations of the dangerous patient
exception would be to the psychotherapist-patient privilege. Three
recent cases simply eliminated confidentiality and privilege for
patients who have demonstrated that they are, will be or have been
dangerous.'79 As Charles Meyers observes:
[such cases] which draft psychotherapists into an army waging war
against antisocial behavior, are part of a trend that extends back to
Tarasoff and that includes the child abuse reporting laws. But in these
three recent cases, psychotherapists are being ordered to do more than
serve as society's early warning system: if they fail to protect potential
victims, psychotherapists are being required to become hostile witnesses,
providers of testimony likely to ensure that their patients will be
convicted and punished. 8
Interestingly, the commentators have not generally distinguished
the application of the preceding criticisms of the Tarasoff duty
from the pre-existing ethical limitations on the confidentiality
standards.' As noted above, the ethical dictates of the mental
health professions traditionally include exceptions to the obligation
177. Suing Psychotherapists, supra note 16, at 368.
178. Tarasoff I, 17 Cal. 3d at 440-42, 551 P.2d at 346-48, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 26-28.
179. People v. Wharton, 53 Cal. 3d 522, 809 P.2d 290,280 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1991); Menendez
v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. App. 4th 147,279 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1991), rev'd in part, 3 Cal. 4th 435, 834
P.2d 786, 11 Cal. Rptr. 92 (1991); People v. Clark, 50 Cal. 3d 583,789 P.2d 127,268 Cal. Rptr. 399
(1990).
180. Charles J. Meyers, Where the Protective Privilege Ends: California Changes the Rules for
Dangerous Psychotherapist Patients, 19 J. PsYcIATRY & L. 26, 26 (1991).
181. See, e.g., Suing Psychotherapists, supra note 16, at 373-74; Ralph Slovenko,
Psychotherapy and Confidentiality, 24 CLEV. ST. L REv. 375, 392-93 (1975) ('Moreover the
[Tarasoft] decision does not drastically affect the psychiatrist as it has long been the general practice
to discreetly warn appropriate individuals or law enforcement authorities when a patient presents a
distinct and immediate threat to someone").
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to preserve confidences where a patient poses a risk of violence to
third parties. I"2 Assuming the ethical dictates regarding disclosure
have some force, many of the detrimental effects imputed to the
Tarasoff decision would appear to apply to the ethical standards as
well. To the extent that the legal duty and ethical duty to disclose
can be regarded as similar, the dire consequences that are imputed
to Tarasoff on clinical practice might well have arisen in the
absence of that decision.
There are, of course, significant differences between the legal
duty imposed under Tarasoff and the psychotherapist's obligations
to disclose under the ethical rules. Most importantly, a judicially-
imposed duty is generally regarded as much more intrusive than an
ethical dictate. Though dangerousness preceded Tarasoff, the
vigorous debate about the psychotherapist's obligation to
endangered third parties did not arise until the court imposed the
duty. Moral obligations are weaker and the potential liability for
violation of a legal duty is typically greater than for an ethical
principle, thereby giving much stronger force to the legal
obligation.8 3 In light of these distinctions, it is likely that a legal
duty to reveal confidences will more markedly affect the psycho-
therapeutic alliance than will ethical duties. For example, the
Stanford Study, conducted one year after Tarasoff II, reported that
therapists were devoting more of their clinical energies to their
patient's minor threats, and feeling more anxiety when a patient's
potential violence became an issue.8 4 Additionally, a small but
significant number of therapists reported reluctance to discuss
issues that might reveal patients' propensities to commit
violence. 1"5 To the extent that effects on clinical practice such as
these have continued to occur seventeen years after Tarasoff, the
impact of the legal duty established in Tarasoff should not be
underestimated.
182. See supra notes 157-164 and accompanying text (discussing the psychotherapist-patient
privilege, embodied in the California Evidence Code and the A.M.A. Principles of Medical Ethics).
183. Although severe sanctions do exist for violations of ethical rules, i.e., loss of one's license
to practice, such sanctions are generally only applied in extreme circumstances.
184. The Stanford Study, supra note 6, at 187-88.
185. Id. at 188.
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IV. METHOD
This study was based on a 1987 survey mailed to 600 licensed
psychiatrists and 1200 licensed psychologists in the state of
California. 86 "The Tarasoff Project" materials were mailed on
January 9, 1987.187 Each survey participant received a cover letter
explaining the purpose of the study, a self-addressed stamped return
envelope, and the Tarasoff survey.188  The survey comprised
thirty-nine multiple choice questions. These questions focused on
five primary issues: (1) biographical information; (2) familiarity
with and understanding of the Tarasoff decision and California
Civil Code section 43.92; (3) ability and willingness of therapists
to comply with Tarasoff, (4) how therapists have responded to the
decision; and (5) the particular effects of Tarasoff upon
psychotherapeutic practice. Upon receipt, each questionnaire
returned before March 1, 1987 was numbered. Multiple-choice
responses were entered into a computer. Responses to open-ended
questions were later recorded and interpreted.
The Tarasoff survey examines therapists' perceptions of the
broad effects which Tarasoff has had on psychotherapeutic practice
over the years. We asked therapists questions which encouraged
them to reflect upon the whole of their practice since the Tarasoff
decision.
In contrast, the Wisconsin Study examined therapists' conduct
in the most recent case wherein the therapist exercised his duty to
protect."' In so doing, the Wisconsin researchers sought to avoid
socially desirable answers to broad questions regarding
psychotherapists' behavior.1 While we recognize that some of
186. We limited our survey to members of the Northern California Psychiatric Association
because of expense. The roster of psychiatrists was obtained from the Northern California Psychiatric
Society. One of every two psychiatrists was randomly selected to participate in the survey. A list of
7200 psychologists was provided by the California Board of Medical Examiners. One of every six
psychologists was invited to respond to the questionnaire. In cases where the sixth psychologist
resided outside of California, the next person on the list with a California address was chosen.
187. The study was originally entitled "The Tarasoff Project."
188. A copy of the Tarasoff Survey and the cover letter are attached as Appendix A.
189. The Wisconsin Study, supra note 4, at 456.
190. Id.
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our questions could have enticed psychologists and psychiatrists to
answer in a socially desirable fashion, the benefits of learning
about the overall effects of the decision upon psychotherapeutic
practice seemed to us to outweigh this potential cost.
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A. Background Information
A total of 872, or 47.1%, of the questionnaire recipients
returned the Tarasoff survey. 91 Of the 872 respondents, 30.7%
were clinical psychiatrists (M.D.), 56% clinical psychologists
(Ph.D.), 1.2% clinical psychologists (M.A.), and 5.2% retired
practitioners." Additionally, 6.7% of the questionnaires were
returned as "others." The data regarding the respondents'
occupations are set forth in Table 1.
191. The questionnaire was mailed to 1850 psychiatrists and psychologists. Approximately forty
were returned by the Post Office as "Addressee Unknown." This effectively reduces our sample size
to 1810, but increases our response rate to 48.2%.
192. As might be expected, retired practitioners often returned the questionnaire without
answering the vast majority of questions. Where appropriate, statistics were corrected for this result
by using valid percentages.
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TABLE 1
OCCUPATION OF RESPONDENTS
Occupation Frequency Valid Percent
Clinical Psychiatrists (M.D.) 266 30.7%
Psychologists (Ph.D) 488 56.3%
Psychologists (M.A.) 10 1.2%
Retired Practitioners 45 5.2%
Others 58 6.7%
Of the survey participants indicating their sex, 72% were male
and 27.3% were female. The majority (62.6%) of respondents fell
between the ages of 31 and 47. The distribution of respondents'
ages is contained in Table 2.
TABLE 2
AGE OF RESPONDENTS
Age (In Years) Frequency Valid Percent
22 to 30 20 2.6%
31 to 37 163 21.5%
38 to 47 313 41.2%
48 to 56 119 15.7%
57 to 65 94 12.4%
greater than 65 50 6.6%
Of those respondents who indicated their gross income, forty
percent were earning between $41,000 and $80,000 annually. Gross
income figures for psychiatrists were higher than for psychologists.
Slightly under sixty percent of the responding psychologists
reported earning between $20,000 and $60,000 annually, as
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compared with almost 25% of the responding psychiatrists. Almost
46% of the psychiatrists reportedly earned between $81,000 and
$150,000, as compared with roughly 26% of the psychologists.
Data regarding respondents' income are reported in Table 3.
TABLE 3
INCOME OF RESPONDENTS
Income Frequency Valid Percent
In Thous. $ Psycol Psycia Overall Psycol Psycia Overall
Less than $20 12 3 17 2.4% 1.1% 1.9%
$20 to $40 72 16 90 14.5% 6.0% 10.3%
$41 to $60 182 50 240 36.6% 18.8% 27.5%
$61 to $80 67 41 109 13.4% 15.4% 12.5%
$81 to $100 73 47 120 14.7% 17.7% 13.8%
$101 to $150 55 75 130 11.1% 28.2% 14.9%
$151 to $200 5 15 20 1.0% 5.6% 2.3%
$201 to $300 5 5 10 1.0% 1.9% 1.1%
Greater than $300 2 1 3 0.4% 0.4% 0.3%
Missing 24 13 133 4.8% 4.9% 15.3%
While most of the respondents were institutionally affiliated, a
substantial proportion were also engaged in private practice.
Eighty-one percent of responding psychiatrists and 94.1% of the
psychologists were involved in some form of private practice. The
data concerning specific affiliations are shown in Table 4.
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100% as some therapists provided multiple
Regarding experience, over 47% of responding practitioners had
practiced between five and fifteen years. Approximately one-third
of the respondent psychologists had practiced between five and ten
years, whereas under 17% of psychiatrists have practiced this
length of time. Additionally, almost one-half of the psychiatrists
had practiced for over fifteen years, as compared to roughly 29%
of the psychologists. Table 5 contains the data reflecting the length
of respondents' practice time.
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Affiliation Frequency Percentages'
(Institution) Psycol Psycia Overall Psycol Psycia Overall
Private Hospital 164 162 327 34.4% 60.9% 37.5%
Public Hospital 62 52 116 12.7% 19.5% 13.3%
Correctional Facility 18 7 25 3.7% 2.6% 2.9%
Primary, Secondary 25 5 30 5.9% 1.9% 3.4%
School
University 150 114 266 32.0% 42.9% 30.5%
No Affiliation 97 17 122 21.9% 6.4% 14.0%
Other Affiliations 112 28 142 24.9% 10.5% 16.3%
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TABLE 5
LENGTH OF RESPONDENTS' PRACTICE TIME
Length Of Practice Frequency Valid Percent
Time in Years Psycol Psycia Overall Psycol Psycia Overall
0 to 5 86 33 122 17.7% 12.5% 15.9%
5 to 10 155 44 199 31.9% 16.7% 26.0%
10 to 15 106 56 163 21.8% 21.2% 21.3%
greater than 15 139 131 282 28.6% 49.6% 36.8%
Respondents were asked how many patients they counsel
annually. 193 Almost 42% of practitioners answering this question
reported counseling between 31 and 100 patients annually. Thirty-
nine percent indicated they had seen over 100 patients per year,
and 19.5% saw between zero and thirty patients yearly. Annual
caseloads for psychologists and psychiatrists vary slightly and are
noted in Table 6.
193. See infra app. A, question No. 5.
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TABLE 6
ANNUAL NUMBER OF PATIENTS SEEN BY
PSYCHOTHERAPISTS
Number Of Patients Frequency Valid Percent
(in categories) Psycol Psycia Overall Psycol Psycia Overall
0 4 0 6 .8% 0.0% 0.8%
1 to 5 11 1 13 2.3% 0.4% 1.7%
6 to 10 13 7 21 2.7% 2.7% 2.8%
11 to 20 26 15 44 5.3% 5.7% 5.8%
21 to 30 48 15 64 9.9% 5.7% 8.4%
31 to 50 95 39 135 19.5% 14.9% 17.7%
51 to 100 128 55 184 26.3% 21.0% 24.2%
greater than 100 161 130 294 33.1% 49.6% 38.6%
Given that anger is a core ingredient of violence, and that the
negotiation of anger is often a theme of psychotherapy, Tarasoff
could potentially affect a large number of clinical practitioners.
Respondents were asked if they had counseled a potentially
dangerous patient post-Tarasoff. 194  Sixty-four percent of
respondents overall and 74.1% of those answering this question
reported counseling dangerous patients after the decision. In
addition, 72% of the survey sample--84% of those answering the
question--found themselves counseling at least one potentially
dangerous patient per year.195 While almost forty percent of the
respondents reported counseling one or two dangerous patients
annually, 56.3% of the sample reported counseling between one
and five dangerous patients per year.
194. See infra app. A, question No. 21.
195. See infra app. A, question No. 22.
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In short, while the base rate for violent behavior is low in the
community, and while potentially violent people do not occupy a
substantial proportion of a psychotherapist's caseload, it is clear
that nearly every practicing therapist has seen a potentially violent
person in treatment. At the very least, many therapists have had an
opportunity to contemplate their Tarasoff obligations.
B. Therapists' Knowledge and Understanding of the Law
The survey results sustain the view that many therapists had
actually considered the Tarasoff decision. Over 84% of the entire
sample indicated that they have heard of Tarasoff.9 6 Further, of
those therapists who answered this question, over 98 % knew of the
decision. Finally, roughly 86% of the respondents indicated that
Tarasoff has manifested specific effects upon their practice.197
In order to determine practitioners' understanding of the case,
therapists were questioned about the precise elements of Tarasoff.
Specifically, therapists were asked to whom they thought the
decision applies, whether a specific individual must be named,
whether a threat must be likely to occur, and to what types of
threatened harm the case is addressed.1 98
Eighty-six percent of the therapists felt that Tarasoff applies to
psychiatrists and 85.1% would apply the decision to clinical
psychologists. 99 This result is consistent with the court's ruling
that a Tarasoff duty arises whenever a special relationship exists
between a therapist and his patient.2
Although the case law does not explain to whom the decision
applies, surveyed psychiatrists and psychologists would extend
196. Overall, 86.4% of the respondents have heard of the Tarasoff decision--98.9% of the
psychiatrists and 97.5% of the psychologists.
197. See infra app. A, question No. 32. Roughly 86% of the respondents indicate that Tarasoff
produced at least one of the effects enumerated in question No. 32.
198. See infra app. A, question Nos. 8, 10, 13, & 9, respectively.
199. See supra notes 111-115 and accompanying text (discussing the professionals to whom
the decision applies).
200. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text (discussing the special relationship).
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liability to other clinical mental health practitioners."' Over 81%
of the respondents believed that Tarasoff applies to clinical social
workers. But fewer than four percent of respondents would apply
Tarasoff to priests and religious counselors.
The Tarasoff court held that a duty to protect arises when a
patient poses a serious threat of danger or violence to a foreseeable
victim.20 2 Recent decisions, however, diminish this foreseeability
requirement. Jablonski, holding that foreseeability may be assessed
from past psychiatric records, and Hedlund, holding that a duty of
care extends to all victims who may be injured as a result of an
unchecked threat, challenge the courts' mandate that a named
victim must be foreseeable to the therapist in order that a duty
203arise.
Despite these changes in the law, almost all of the practitioners
surveyed indicated that the patient must identify a specific victim
for Tarasoffto apply. In particular, 96% of the therapists answering
this question--82.5% of the entire sample--believed that the patient
must identify a specific victim to invoke Tarasoff. Four percent of
the responding therapists thought that the decision applied where
the patient makes a general threat. Fourteen percent of the sample
did not respond to this question.
The most probable interpretation of these results is that
therapists understand Tarasoff, but are unaware of the Jablonski
and Hedlund decisions. Alternately, it may well be that
practitioners are aware of the recent changes, but do not think that
the courts will enforce them in subsequent decisions. It is also
possible that respondents narrowly construed the question as
applying only to Tarasoff and not to other cases which have
subsequently modified the decision.
The Tarasoff court also decided that a duty to protect is partly
contingent upon the existence of a "serious threat of danger or
201. See supra notes 111-115 and accompanying text (discussing the professionals to whom
the decision applies).
202. See supra notes 48-89 and accompanying text (discussing the foreseeability requirements
after Tarasoffi.
203. See supra notes 70-89 and accompanying text (discussing the Jablonski and Hedlund
cases).
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violence."'' "4 Later decisions acknowledge this requirement. The
Jablonski court would have gleaned the seriousness of the threat
and its seriousness from the patient's past psychiatric records." 5
The majority of therapists in this study believed that Tarasoff
applies where the patient poses a threat which is likely to be
carried out. Seventy-one percent of respondents who answered this
question believed that Tarasoff applies only to likely threats.0 6
Meanwhile, 28.9% of responding therapists believed that Tarasoff
applies to all threats.0 7 Almost 15% of those surveyed did not
respond.
Practitioners were then asked about their understanding of the
type of threatened harm contemplated by Tarasoff."8 The results
indicate that 67.9% of respondents overall stated that the decision
applies to threats of personal injury; 81.4% indicated that Tarasoff
applies where a patient threatens homicide; and 11.9% responded
that the case relates to threats of property damage. There were no
significant differences between the responses given by psychiatrists
and those given by psychologists.
The clear majority of practitioners recognize that Tarasoff
applies when a patient threatens some type of physical injury. This
view is consistent with the court's ruling in Bellah v. Greenson,
which limited the application of Tarasoff to threats of personal
harm."M Interestingly, practitioners distinguished between the
204. See supra notes 90-105 and accompanying text (discussing the nature of a threat).
205. See supra notes 102-105 and accompanying text (discussing evidence from prior records).
206. Our findings are lower than those of the Wisconsin Study which determined that 95% of
psychologists and 94% of psychiatrists in California believe that Tarasoff applies when a patient
threatens harm to another and when the therapist believes that there is a serious possibility that the
patient might do so. The Wisconsin Study, supra note 4,at 461. The results are also lower than the
Wisconsin Study's discovery that 89% of psychiatrists and 93% of psychologists in California believe
that Tarasoffapplies when a client threatens harm to another and a reasonable therapist would believe
that there is a serious possibility that the patient may do so. Id at 462. It should be noted that the
format of this question in the Wisconsin Study may have suggested the answer to respondent
psychotherapists, and would explain why the Wisconsin Study's findings are so much higher.
207. These numbers reflect valid percentages.
208. This question has mutually exclusive answers. We did not control for respondents giving
more than one answer. The sum of the percentages thus exceeds 100%.
209. See supra notes 106-110 and accompanying text (discussing Bellah). These findings are
consistent with those of the Stanford Study. The study indicated that nearly 75% of the respondents
believed that the decision applies when a patient threatens murder or violent physical injury. The
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types of physical injury intended. The more grave the danger, the
more willing therapists are to apply Tarasoff Under Bellah, this
distinction is unnecessary since therapists are bound when a patient
threatens any physical injury.21
The court in Bellah ftirther held that Tarasoff does not apply
where a patient threatens self-inflicted harm or suicide.21' Despite
this holding, 14.8% of responding therapists believed that Tarasoff
applies in suicide cases. Interestingly, psychologists' and
psychiatrists' responses differ on this question. While 23% of
psychologists believed that Tarasoff applies to suicidal threats, only
six percent of psychiatrists held this belief. In spite of this finding,
the overwhelming proportion of the sample--85.2%--correctly
understood that Tarasoff does not apply to suicidal threats." 2
In sum, the majority of therapists believed that Tarasoff applies
to clinical psychologists, psychiatrists, and social workers. They
additionally believed that Tarasoff applies when a specific victim
has been identified, when a patient's threat is likely to be carried
out, and when the threat involves personal injury or homicide.
These perceptions are consistent with Tarasoff and the majority of
subsequent decisions. To the extent that Hedlund and Jablonski
have modified the law, however, the psychotherapists' responses do
not reflect knowledge of current legal doctrine.
In addition to studying psychotherapists' grasp of the case law,
we examined therapists' familiarity with and understanding of
California Civil Code section 43.92.213 Thirty percent of the
therapists reported being familiar with the statute, while 55 % of the
respondents were unaware of the statute, and 15% did not respond
to the question. Of those who acknowledged familiarity with the
Stanford Study, supra note 6, at 178.
210. Bellah, 81 Cal. App. 3d at 621-22, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 539-40.
211. Id
212. The Stanford Study determined that 21% of respondents overall believe that Tarasoff
applies to threats of suicide. The Stanford Study, supra note 6, at 178. Apparently more psychiatrists
than psychologists have learned about the holding in Bellah during the last nine years.
213. See supra note 118 (providing the text of the statute in full).
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statute, 40% of them were psychologists and 25.9% were
psychiatrists.214
Therapists were also examined for their knowledge of the
statute. Specifically, respondents were asked who must be warned
under section 43.92.215 Sixty-five percent of the practitioners
thought section 43.92 requires therapists to warn potential victims,
and 46.3% thought the statute requires warning the police.216 Of
the 30% of the sample who reported being familiar with section
43.92, only 50.5% of the respondents understood that the statute
requires that both (and only both) the police and potential victims
must be warned.
These results are surprising in view of prior requests by
psychiatric and psychological organizations for statutory guidelines
to safeguard psychotherapists from potential liability.2"7 Either
these organizations have not undertaken rigorous efforts to inform
their members of the existence and provisions of section 43.92, or
the membership has not absorbed the lessons.
C. Therapists and the Prediction of Dangerousness
Tarasoff has been widely criticized for imposing liability based
upon practitioners' predictions of future dangerousness.2"' Critics
contend that mental health professionals are simply unable to
predict potential dangerousness in their patients. It has also been
argued that Tarasoff inhibits effective therapy, and that therapists
may avoid potentially dangerous patients as a result of the
decision.2"9
214. A significant positive relationship was found between therapists' familiarity with § 43.92
and the number of years that therapists were in practice. x2 = 9.91; with 3 d.f., sig. at 0.02.
215. See infra app. A, question No. 12.
216. Additionally, 13% of respondents thought § 43.92 requires warning a potential suicide
victim's family and 12.6% thought the statute requires warning any potential victim's family.
217. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (providing statement by the California
Psychological Institute).
218. See supra notes 131-156 and accompanying text (discussing the predictability of
dangerousness).
219. See supra notes 131-152 and accompanying text.
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This study sought to determine whether and how the obligation
to predict dangerousness imposed by Tarasoff affects
psychotherapeutic practice. Therapists were questioned regarding
the number of dangerous patients they counsel, their perceived
ability to predict potential dangerousness, and whether and why
they avoid counseling potentially dangerous individuals.2 We
found that the majority of practitioners face situations where they
must assess potential dangerousness. Sixty-four percent of the
respondents reported having counseled a potentially dangerous
patient since Tarasoff.221 In addition, 72% of the sample indicated
that they see at least one potentially dangerous person annually.
Therapists were then asked to determine how well they believe
they can predict potential dangerousness. Few psychotherapists
reported that they could assess dangerousness "very accurately"--
4.3% overall; 5.3% of psychologists, and only 1.6% of
psychiatrists. Almost 30% of responding practitioners believed that
they could predict potential dangerousness "somewhat accurately."
Meanwhile, the overwhelming proportion of psychotherapists--
72.5% of the psychiatrists, 63.7% of the psychologists, and 66.3%
of the sample who answered this question--felt that they could
predict dangerousness "better than chance"' or "not at all." These
data are reported in Table 7..
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TABLE 7
THERAPISTS' ABILITY To PREDICT
POTENTIAL DANGEROUSNESS
Ability To Predict Frequency Valid Percent
Psycol Psycia Overall Psycol Psycia~verall
Very Accurately 25 4 32 5.3% 1.6% 4.3%
Somewhat Accurately 146 67 218 31.0% 26.0% 29.4%
Better Than Chance 258 156 419 54.8% 60.5% 56.5%
Not At All 42 31 73 8.9% 12.0% 9.8%
The majority of psychotherapists are uncomfortable with their
ability to predict. Although the findings do not speak to whether
psychotherapists are actually able to assess potential dangerousness,
they do indicate that therapists' perceived predictive efficacy is
weak.2" To the extent that perceived ability is a strong indicator
of actual ability, these results suggest that psychotherapists' ability
to predict future dangerous behavior is limited.223
The criticisms leveled at Tarasoff appear justified in view of
psychotherapists' responses. Tarasoff imposes a duty upon
practitioners based on an assessment which practitioners feel
incompetent to make. As a result, therapists may overpredict
dangerous behavior for fear of Tarasoff liability.24  Such
overprediction may also prompt psychotherapists to overcommit
patients and to warn others unnecessarily.2" Moveover, unless
therapists are wholly misguided about their ability to predict, the
results indicate that a community standard which judges prac-
222. See generally ALBERT BANDuRA, SocIAL FOUNDATIONS oF THOUGHT AND ACTION Ch.
9 (1986) (discussing implications of self-efficacy).
223. The survey did not ask about the bases psychotherapists use to assess dangerousness.
224. See supra notes 143-145 and accompanying text (discussing post-Tarasoff risk of
overprediction and unnecessary commitment).
225. See supra notes 146-148 and accompanying text (discussing risk of unnecessary warnings).
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titioners' behavior based on their ability to predict dangerousness
is untenable and inappropriate.226
To determine whether psychotherapists' perceived ability to
predict dangerousness varies with the length of time they have been
practicing, responses to questions two and twenty-four were
examined.227  No statistically significant results emerged.22
Thus, practitioners do not become more comfortable with
predicting dangerousness as they progress in their careers.
Another criticism of Tarasoff is that it deters therapists from
counseling potentially dangerous patients. 229 To determine if this
is true, therapists were asked whether and why they avoid
counseling potentially dangerous patients. A surprisingly high
proportion of the respondents--roughly 46% of the psychotherapists
surveyed--reported that they do avoid counseling potentially
dangerous patients. Additionally, of those therapists who avoid
these patients, 40.3% answering this question indicated that they
avoid potentially dangerous patients at least in part because of fear
of Tarasoff liability.
Over sixty percent of respondents indicated avoiding potentially
dangerous patients because of the nature of the work.230
Specifically, 39% of responding psychotherapists stated that they
avoid counseling potentially dangerous patients because "it is
difficult work." Of the "other reasons" reported by
psychotherapists, the most often cited rationale was fear for
personal safety.
Although a substantial proportion of psychotherapists avoid
counseling potentially dangerous individuals for reasons unrelated
to Tarasoff, a striking minority indicate that the decision has
influenced their behavior regarding treatment of potentially
dangerous individuals. Patients who might ordinarily be admitted
226. See supra notes 134-140 and accompanying text (discussing mental health professionals'
inability to predict future dangerousness).
227. See infra app. A, question Nos. 2 & 24.
228. x2 = 10.78, ns.
229. See supra notes 143-145 and accompanying text (discussing post-Tarasoff risk of
overprediction and unnecessary commitment).
230. See infra app. A, question No. 23a.
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to treatment may have been denied proper psychological counseling
at least in part because of the decision. Moreover, therapists who
feel unable to assess potential dangerousness are no more likely to
avoid counseling dangerous patients than those who feel competent
at such assessments.231 Self-perceived skill (or lack thereof) in
predicting violent behavior seems unrelated to therapists' willing-
ness to accept potentially dangerous patients in treatment.
Tarasoff seems to have changed the nature of clinical
practice.232 Roughly 37% of therapists surveyed indicated that
Tarasoff has led them to focus more frequently on dangerousness
with their patients. In addition, 32% of therapists reported that they
concentrate more often on patients' less serious threats. Although
the results certainly indicate that Tarasoff has affected psycho-
therapeutic practice, it is unclear whether these effects are
beneficial to patients.
Focusing upon dangerousness may benefit those patients who
need to discuss this issue. Not every patient, however, requires
psychotherapy which disproportionately centers on dangerousness.
To the extent that Tarasoff forces therapists to focus upon danger-
ousness at the expense of exploring other issues, the decision
hinders successful therapy.
Many psychotherapists encourage their patients to express
themselves freely during therapy. In fact, patients often make trivial
threats throughout their sessions.233 As illustrated by the finding
that therapists focus more frequently on less serious threats,
therapists have difficulty deciding which threats are sufficiently
serious to require action under Tarasoff. Consequently, practitioners
may become too preoccupied with the seriousness determination to
concentrate on other important issues.
231. See infra app. A, question Nos. 23 & 24.
232. See infra app. A, question No. 32.
233. See supra notes 170-172 and accompanying text (explaining the nature of verbalization
during therapy).
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D. Confidentiality and the Therapist's Duty Under Tarasoff
Critics of the Tarasoff decision contend that requiring psycho-
therapists to breach confidentiality will detrimentally impact the
psychotherapeutic alliance." 4 They argue that patients not given
assurances of confidentiality will be deterred from seeking therapy,
will divulge less sensitive information during therapy, and will
distrust their psychotherapist--ultimately making therapy less
effective.235 Our survey examined (1) therapists' attitudes toward
confidentiality, and (2) therapists' perceptions of whether their
potential obligation to breach confidentiality has had counter-
therapeutic effects.
Confidentiality is considered a cornerstone of psychotherapeutic
practice."' Nonetheless, 79% of the therapists surveyed believed
that while absolute confidentiality is important for successful
therapy, a breach of confidentiality may be warranted in certain
circumstances. Only eight percent of the therapists felt confi-
dentiality should be absolute.237 A majority of these practitioners
were in practice fifteen years or longer.238 By comparison, the
Stanford Study, conducted one year after Tarasoff, found that 26%
of therapists surveyed thought confidentiality should never be
breached."3 The Stanford results are consistent with our findings
that therapists who began practice prior to Tarasoff are more
inclined to feel confidentiality should be inviolate. Such findings
additionally suggest that therapists' attitudes toward confidentiality
may have been influenced by the duty established in Tarasoff. In
234. See supra notes 166-169 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 170-172 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 158-161 and accompanying text.
237. See infra app. A, question No. 14. Only 0.1% of the therapists believe confidentiality is
-unimportant, of marginal value,- and 13.3% of the therapists did not respond to this question.
Attitudes toward confidentiality did not differ among psychologists and psychiatrists.
238. Of therapists who thought confidentiality was "essential, should never be breached under
any circumstances," 8.7% have been in practice between 0-5 years, 13% have been in practice 5-10
years, 23.2% have been practicing 10-15 years, and 55.1% have been practicing fifteen years or
longer.
239. The Stanford Study further found that 69.7% of surveyed psychotherapists thought
confidentiality could be breached in certain circumstances, 0.9% thought confidentiality was of
marginal value, and 3.3% did not respond. The Stanford Study, supra note 6, at 176 n.65.
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particular, therapists' increased willingness to disclose patient
confidences to outside parties might reflect the legal obligation
imposed upon them since Tarasoff.
This interpretation, however, is softened in light of results
which show that absent a duty to protect third parties, 97.5% of the
respondents reported that they would or probably would warn a
potential of harm.24 ° This finding is consistent with the results of
the earlier Stanford Study, which found that prior to Tarasoff, half
of the surveyed therapists treating potentially dangerous patients
had warned a potential victim, a potential victim's family, or the
police on at least one occasion.241 Thus, one might conclude that
therapists' willingness to warn might not result from their Tarasoff
obligation. Rather, the legal duty to breach confidentiality when
patients threaten others parallels therapists' professional and ethical
convictions. This, however, is not a viable conclusion regarding
other warnable dangers, as we shall see.
Despite therapists' apparent willingness to breach confi-
dentiality in certain cases, they are often unwilling to discuss the
possibility of disclosure with their patients during therapy. Fifty-
seven percent of responding therapists reported always discussing
the general nature of confidentiality with their patients. 242 A
much smaller percentage of respondents, 22.1%, however, always
discuss the possibility that confidentiality might be breached by the
therapist during therapy as a result of the patient's communications.
In addition, 65.8% of all psychotherapists indicated they "almost
always" or "sometimes" discuss the possibility of disclosure with
their patients.243 The results clearly indicate that the vast majority
240. Specifically, 28.4% of the responding therapists indicated they would warn regardless of
a legal obligation, 69.3% answered it depended on the circumstances, and 2.5 % answered that absent
a legal obligation they would not warn.
241. The Stanford Study, supra note 6, at 183.
242. Oftherapists responding to question No. 15, 42.3% sometimes discuss confidentiality with
their patients, and 0.4% never discuss the issue with their patients at all. Sixty-six percent of
psychologists, as compared with 42.9% of psychiatrists, reported always discussing confidentiality
with their patients.
243. Of therapists responding to question No. 16, 15.8% almost always discuss the possibility
of disclosure, 50.1% sometimes discuss this possibility, and 12.0% never discuss with their patients
the possibility that confidentiality may be breached.
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of therapists discuss their Tarasoff obligations with patients whom
they perceive as dangerous when these patients threaten harm. A
higher percentage of psychologists as compared with psychiatrists
discuss the possibility of disclosure with all of their patients, and
they discuss this possibility at the outset of therapy.2' The
findings regarding when and with whom therapists discuss the
possibility of disclosure are shown in Tables 8 and 9.
TABLE 8
WHEN THERAPISTS Discuss PossBirLr
OF DISCLOSURE WITH PATIENTS
Percentage Percentage Percentage
Time Of Discussion Psycol Psycia Overall*
As a general practice at
the outset of therapy 43.3% 12.0% 26.5%
As a general practice
during therapy, but not at
the outset 15.9% 13.5% 12.8%
When a patient asks
directly 16.9% 24.8% 16.6%
When a patient threatens
violence 52.8% 75.2% 51.4%
*Percentages exceed 100% as some therapists provided multiple responses.
244. As indicated in Table 8,43.3% of psychologists, as compared with 12% of psychiatrists,
discuss their Tarasoff obligations with their patients at the outset of therapy. x2 = 47.03; these
findings were significant beyond the .005 level with 1 degree of freedom.
Table 8 also indicates that 52.8% of psychologists, as compared with 75.2% of psychiatrists,
discuss the possibility of disclosure only when their patients threaten harm. x2 = 107.94; these
findings are significant beyond the .001 level with 1 degree of freedom.
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TABLE 9




All patients 38.6% 8.6% 22.4%
Patients perceived as 62.5% 74.1% 57.0%
dangerous
Patients perceived as 15.0% 6.8% 10.2%
suicidal
No patients 7.2% 13.9% 7.8%
*Percentages exceed 100% as some therapists provided multiple responses
Clinicians' reluctance to discuss their potential Tarasoff
obligations may stem from a belief that doing so would have
countertherapeutic effects. For instance, sixty percent of responding
psychotherapists felt their patients were at least somewhat more
reluctant to divulge sensitive information when aware that their
confidences could potentially be disclosed.245  Moreover,
therapists who discuss their Tarasoffobligations when their patients
voice a threat are more inclined to feel they have lost a patient due
to a potential breach of confidentiality than therapists who discuss
disclosure as a general practice during therapy, or when a patient
asks whether his communications are absolutely confidential. These
results suggest that the more a patient has reason to believe his
confidences will be disclosed, the more likely he may be to
terminate psychotherapy.
245. Specifically, when asked: "Once your patients become aware that you might discuss their
case with a third party, do they seem reluctant to divulge certain information to you?", 13.3% of
answering practitioners responded "Yes," 46.6% responded "Yes, somewhat," and 39.9% answered
"No." See infra app. A, question No. 19.
Whether patients were in fact reluctant to disclose information cannot be empirically determined
from this study. The results reflect only therapists' perceptions of their patients' behavior.
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A significant proportion of therapists who discussed Tarasoff at
the outset of therapy felt that they had lost patients as a result.
Patients who are aware that their confidences could be disclosed
may be more apt to leave therapy at the outset since a trusting
therapist-patient relationship has not yet been established. The
findings of the study are displayed in Table 10 below.
TABLE 10
TIMING OF DISCUSSION OF DISCLOSURE
AND PERCEiVED Loss OF PATIENTS
Time of Discussion Therapists Who Felt They
Lost Patients as a Result
As a general practice at the outset of
therapy 26.3%
As a general practice during therapy 8.5%
When a patient directly asks 15.1%
When a patient threatens harm 50.2%
With 3 degrees of freedom x2 = 104.37; significant beyond .001.
Nevertheless, a significant percentage of practitioners, 39.9%,
did not feel their patients' awareness of the possibility of disclosure
altered the content of their communications. Also, 71.8% of the
respondents did not think that any of their patients ever left therapy
as a result of learning that confidentially may be breached.
In sum, although psychotherapists feel confidentiality is an
important element of successful therapy, many concede it may be
breached if their patients threaten harm. Nonetheless, most
therapists refrain from discussing the possibility of disclosure with
their patients during therapy. A possible explanation for this
behavior is a belief by therapists that an illusion of confidentiality
1215
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is necessary for effective psychotherapeutic treatment. Indeed,
therapists note a reluctance on the part of patients to divulge
confidential information once aware that their confidences could
potentially be disclosed. To the extent that candid disclosure is
necessary for successful psychotherapy, patients' awareness of the
limits of confidentiality may decrease the possibility of achieving
successful therapeutic results.
E. Warning Third Parties About Other Dangers
Potentially violent patients are clearly dangerous. But violence
is not the only danger with which a therapist and society must
contend. Patients can be dangerous for a variety of reasons:
because they have herpes, for example, or syphilis or AIDS. We
were concerned particularly with AIDS because it is presently both
deadly and incurable. We asked: "Would you disclose to a sexual
partner or potential sexual partner of one of your patients that the
patient has contracted syphilis, herpes or the AIDS virus?"
Eighteen percent of the respondents failed to answer this
question. Somewhat more than 13 % said they would disclose, while
another 2% indicated that their behavior would depend on the
circumstances. But fully 62% indicated that they would not disclose
to the patient's sexual partner or potential sexual partner that the
patient had syphilis, herpes or AIDS.
Not everyone who has syphilis, herpes or AIDS necessarily
transmits the disease each time he or she has sexual contact, any
more than a potentially violent person will necessarily be violent
on each interpersonal contact. Both sexually transmittable diseases
and violence-proneness are probabalistic disorders. Yet therapists
take a vastly different view of violence-proneness than AIDS. The
one is to be reported, the other, in the main, concealed. Why
should that be? Surely the ethical requirements to warn relevant
others are similar for both kinds of dangers. It is difficult to avoid
1216
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the conclusion that therapists feel duty-bound by Tarasoff and
statute in the first instance, and not at all in the second.
F. Psychotherapists and Warning Behavior
This survey aimed to discover how Tarasoff has affected
psychotherapeutic practice. Because prior studies demonstrated that
California psychologists and psychiatrists overwhelmingly interpret
Tarasoff to require therapists to warn third parties, the survey
focused on therapists' warning behavior. Specifically,
psychotherapists were asked: (1) Whether they have warned since
Tarasoff, (2) if so, who therapists warn; (3) how often they warn;
and (4) what primarily influences their decision to warn.
Our results indicate that psychotherapists typically warn third
parties. Indeed, 91.4% of responding psychotherapists had never
refrained from warning a potential victim where they thought
Tarasoff applied.247 Thirty-nine percent of the respondents had
warned a potential victim on at least one occasion; 54% of the
clinicians had warned a potential suicide victim's family;248 and
46% had warned the police.249
The percentage of therapists warning third parties has increased
substantially since the Tarasoff decision. The Stanford Study
concluded that prior to Tarasoff, 16.7% of respondent
psychotherapists had warned a potential victim." A comparison
of the two studies reveals that twice as many therapists are warning
potential victims after Tarasoff than before. A. somewhat higher
proportion of therapists have warned potential suicide victims'
families after the decision. Furthermore, since Tarasoff almost
twice as many practitioners have warned the police.
247. Of the 8.6% of respondents who have refrained from warning a potential victim, the two
most frequently provided explanations were: (1) Breaching confidentiality may detrimentally affect
the therapeutic relationship; and (2) uncertainty regarding the likelihood that the threat will be carried
out.
248. While 54.2% of the therapists have warned the family of a patient's danger to himself,
45.8% indicated that they have not warned. There wire no significant differences between
psychiatrists and psychologists.
249. The results for psychologists and psychiatrists are similar.
250. The Stanford Study, supra note 6, at 179.
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On average, psychotherapists in the present study had warned
potential victims 2.61 times."1 Potential suicide victims' families
were warned, on average, 5.7 times. 2 Further, therapists warned
the police an average of 3.28 times."
Psychotherapists provide several explanations for why they
decide to warn. 4 The predominant reason cited is their concern
for the patient or potential victim. The second most frequently
mentioned reason is fear of Tarasoff liability. The next most
popular response is fear of liability under California Civil Code
section 43.92.
The fact that therapists warn potential suicide victims' families
out of concern for the patient is not surprising. While the law does
not impose a legal duty to warn where a patient threatens
suicide,255 psychotherapists may warn families because of a pro-
tective or an ethical, not legal, impulse.
Many therapists also warn the police out of concern for the
potential victim, even though the police are neither bound to
protect or warn. 6 They may warn police out of fear of Tarasoff
251. For the mean number of times therapists have warned potential victims, the variance =
4.58 and the standard deviation = 4.59.
252. For the mean number of times therapists have warned the family of a patient's potential
suicide, the variance = 90.4 and the standard deviation = 90.6.
253. For the mean number of times therapists have warned the police, the variance = 4.90 and
the standard deviation = 4.92.
254. Therapists cite several factors which have primarily influenced their decisions to warn a
potential victim: Fear of Tarasoff liability, 39.4%; fear of liability under California Civil Code §
43.92, 14.6%; concern for the patient, 41.9%; and "other reasons," 4.1%.
Therapists also cite several reasons why they warn the patient's family of a patient's danger to
himself: Fear of potential liability under Tarasoff, 13.8 %; fear of liability under California Civil Code
§ 43.92, 9.0%; and "other reasons," 4.4%. The rationale most often mentioned, 70.7% of the time,
is concern for the patient.
Finally, therapists provide several explanations why they decide to warn the police: Potential
Tarasofflability, 29.0%; fear of statutory liability, 14.1%; concern for the patient, 54.6%; and "other
reasons," cited 1.9% of the time.
The above percentages reflect the explanations psychotherapists reported as primarily
influencing their decisions to warn. Since these answers are not mutually exclusive, we cannot infer
whether a given response was the sole motivation factor in therapists' decisions to warn.
255. See supra notes 107-109 and accompanying text (discussing the duty to warn about suicide
threats).
256. See supra note 115 and accompanying text (discussing application of duty to warn beyond
mental health professionals).
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liability, or because they believe that warning the police fulfills the
"reasonable steps" requirement of TarasoffI. 1
Approximately as many therapists have warned potential
victims out of fear of Tarasoff liability as from a concern for the
potential victim. While Tarasoff seems to be a prime motivating
force behind therapists' decisions to warn, many also warn
potential victims out of an ethical concern. In fact, 97.5% of the
respondent psychotherapists say they would warn a potential victim
of threatened harm regardless of liability under Tarasoff or section
43.92. These findings suggest that psychotherapists feel both
ethically and legally obligated to warn.
G. Specific Effects of Tarasoff
Although many psychotherapists would have been willing to
warn regardless of Tarasoff, all psychotherapists must contend with
potential Tarasoff liability. Forty-nine percent of therapists
surveyed said they were more afraid of lawsuits since Tarasoff.5'8
The Stanford Study, conducted one year after the decision, found
that 55.7% of the therapists surveyed were more fearful of being
sued under Tarasoff.'9 The present findings suggest that Tarasoff
did not have an ephemeral effect on therapists, but has continued
to generate concern eleven years after the decision.
The results show that Tarasoff seems to have directly shaped
psychotherapeutic practice in a variety of ways. For example,
Tarasoff has affected the content of patient-therapist communi-
cations during therapy. Thirty-seven percent of the respondents
indicated a greater tendency to discuss patients' propensities to
commit violence.2 ° Thirty-two percent of the psychotherapists
257. Tarasoff H, 17 Cal. 3d at 430-31, 551 P.2d at 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
258. Out of 872 respondents, only two reported being sued under Tarasoff--one psychologist
and one psychiatrist. Each individual indicated he had been sued only once.
259. The Stanford Study, supra note 6, at 181 n.86.
260. The Stanford Study found 26.8% of the respondent therapists reported the Tarasoffruling
led them to focus more often on the issue of dangerousness during therapy. Id. at 181 n.83.
Interestingly, the Stanford Study also found that 16% of respondents felt the decision led them to
avoid exploring issues of dangerousness with their patients. lId at 182 n.87.
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reported attending more to their patient's minor threats.26 Fifty-
one percent of the subjects more frequently inform their patients
that they might be obliged to discuss the patient outside the clinical
setting. 26
2
Thus, it appears that Tarasoff is having its intended effect.
Therapists are making more extensive inquiries into patients'
violent tendencies, and may thereby discover more instances where
their patients threaten harm. But this benefit must be weighed
against the potential cost of diverting clinicians' energies away
from exploring other important issues with their non-violent
patients.
Psychotherapists' desire to avoid legal liability has also been
reflected in other aspects of their practice. Thirty-two percent of the
therapists noted that their record-keeping methods have been
influenced by the Tarasoff decision. Similarly, the Stanford Study
found that 28.1% of the therapists surveyed noted changes in their
record-keeping behavior.263  Whether therapists are actually
keeping more detailed records cannot be determined from the
results of our study. However, regardless of the direction in which
record-keeping habits have moved, this change has presumably
been motivated by therapists' efforts to avoid legal liability.2 4
Additionally, 41.0% of the subjects noted that, as a result of
Tarasoff, they were more inclined to consult with other pro-
fessionals when treating potentially dangerous patients.265
Approximately eight percent more of the therapists noted such a
change than in the earlier Stanford Study.266 And to the extent
261. This finding represents a 13% increase over the Stanford Study's findings. See id. at 181.
262. This finding was higher for psychologists than psycliatrists. Sixty-six percent of
psychologists as compared with 51% of psychiatrists reported informing their patients more often that
they might be obligated to discuss the patient to persons outside the clinical setting.
263. The Stanford Study, supra note 6, at 182 n.88.
264. Id.
265. See infra app. A, question No. 32. Only .2% of the practitioners felt less inclined since
Tarasoffto consult with the police when treating a dangerous patient.
266. See The Stanford Study, supra note 6, at 181 n.85. Subjects in the Stanford Study were
asked whether Tarasoffhas increased or decreased their contacts with professionals when treating a
dangerous patient. Although therapists probably interpreted "professionals" to mean colleagues, they
may have been referring to consultations with professionals outside the mental health profession, i.e.,
with attorneys. lM. The Stanford Study found that 32.9% of respondent therapists increased their
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these consultations provide therapists with second opinions on
whether patients' threats will be carried out, therapists may be less
likely to give unnecessary warnings.
These results suggest that the Stanford Study findings did not
reflect a temporary reaction to the sensationalism that surrounded
Tarasoff when the decision was in its infancy. Rather, it appears
that Tarasoff has greatly influenced clinical practice in the past
decade, and will, in all likelihood, continue to exert an influence on
clinical practice in the future.
VI. CONCLUSION
Tarasoff plunged psychotherapists into uncharted waters. Until
that decision, therapists viewed treatment as a collaborative
arrangement; one in which the patient was maximally honest, and
the therapist maximally helpful. The notion of a therapeutic
alliance, in which both therapist and patient joined for the patient's
welfare, seemed to capture the spirit of the endeavor. With
Tarasoff, the nature of the therapeutic endeavor changed quite
perceptibly. Psychotherapists with no prior experience in the fora
now needed to assess their legal vulnerability with each and every
treatment encounter. They attended quite carefully to the possibility
that a patient was dangerous to others. In the main, wherever
possible and for whatever reasons, they tried to avoid such patients.
But once admitted to treatment, a substantial proportion took
seriously all threats, and not only those that were likely to
eventuate in violence. They altered the nature of their practice, now
inquiring more into violent propensities, subtly shifting the focus
of treatment to investigations that might shed light on their
patient's dangerousness, and away from other emotional issues, all
in the hope of protecting society and avoiding liability themselves.
It has been an uphill and unsatisfying contest. For victory in
these encounters depends almost wholly on the therapists' ability
to predict violent behavior, and very few therapists--only 4.3%--
feel that they can predict dangerousness very accurately. The vast
contact with professionals when counseling a potentially dangerous patient. Id.
1221
Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 24
majority of therapists perceive their abilities more modestly, feeling
that they can predict dangerousness only better than chance, or not
at all. Thus, the law is predicated on skills that even now, in data
obtained some eleven years after Tarasoff, psychotherapists feel
they have not acquired, and may in fact not ever acquire.267
In accord with law, psychotherapists continue to warn patients
that certain conversation is not confidential and will need to be
revealed to relevant third parties. And in accord with expectation,
many of these patients simply abandon treatment. We do not know
how many flee and continue to menace society, and how many
remain in treatment despite the threat to confidentiality, and emerge
the better and safer for that treatment. But we do know that the
numbers in each case are substantial. Close to three-quarters of the
therapists counsel at least one dangerous person. And a substantial
proportion counsel many.
Does the law, with the burdens placed on psychotherapists and
the consequent avoidance of treatment by (at least some) dangerous
persons, substantially protect society? Readers will arrive at their
own judgments in this matter. But that judgment will likely remain
clouded until we have some decent data on the efficacy of
treatment for preventing violence. At this writing, those data are
lacking.268 Were there positive evidence for the utility of
psychotherapy for preventing violent behavior, one could quarrel
more vigorously with Justice Tobriner's adage that "the protective
privilege ends where the public peril begins." To the extent that the
"protective privilege" is part of the putative efficacy of
psychotherapy, and to the extent that one could locate evidence for
the utility of psychotherapy in the treatment of violence, one might
well want to augment the protective privilege when the public peril
is involved. Unfortunately, that is not yet the case.
Tarasoff and "duty to warn" have remained catchwords to a
large number of psychotherapists; catchwords for liability that
267. But see supra note 140 (discussing recent findings regarding the relationship between
mental disorder and violent behavior).
268. See generally D.L RosENHAN & M.E.P. SELIMAN, ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOOY cs. 15,
18, 19 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing treatment of violent individuals).
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simultaneously seem to invoke both vigilance and avoidance. Of
vigilance we have already written. Relatively unnoticed, however,
is the fact that psychotherapists seem to have avoided dealing with
some aspects of the law, and particularly seem not to have wrestled
with the details of the law. Most of them seem not to have heard
of the California Civil Code that regulates psychotherapists'
behavior in matters of violence. They seem unaware of their
obligation to notify both the victim and the police; that only
serious threats are of legal concern; that only threats of violence to
others, and not to self, are the concerns of the law; or that families
need not be notified.
Most disturbing of all is the failure of psychotherapists to
understand the ethical and legal dilemma posed by patients who
have contagious diseases: herpes, syphilis and especially AIDS.
Nearly 20% failed to respond to the survey question addressing this
dilemma. Of those who did, 62% said they would not inform the
sexual partner or potential sexual partner if one of their patients
was infected with one of these viruses. The question itself elicited
a veritable outpouring of notes and comments. Some 2%, for
example, said that what they would do depended on the
circumstances; 4.5% indicated in writing that they would disclose
for AIDS alone; while only 9.4% would disclose for all three
diseases. Nothing made clearer how much the concern about
Tarasoff was a concern about physical violence, arising from the
traditional anxieties about the relationship between madness and
brutality. It is not centrally one about harm to others, harm which
may arise from more modern diseases, even in consensual contexts.
Such concerns may not impress themselves on psychotherapists'
consciousness until, unfortunately, new case law intrudes.
Practitioners believe that confidentiality is important to
psychotherapy, but are willing to breach confidentiality in limited
circumstances. Nonetheless, therapists are generally unwilling to
discuss the possibility of disclosure, except when patients perceived
as dangerous threaten harm. Many therapists believe patients who
are aware that their confidences may be revealed are more reluctant
to divulge certain information during therapy. Most therapists,
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however, do not believe they have ever lost a patient due to a
potential breach of confidentiality.
Our study determined that many psychotherapists have warned
third parties since Tarasoff A major motivating factor behind
therapists' decisions to warn is concern for the potential victim or
patient. This conclusion is consistent with our discovery that
psychotherapists would warn absent a common law or statutory
obligation. Many psychotherapists warn because of their own
ethical beliefs; thus, Tarasoff may not represent a radical departure
from therapists' pre-existing views. Rather, Tarasoff may be
considered a legal embodiment of therapists' ethical convictions.
Fear of Tarasoff liability was also frequently cited as a driving
force behind therapists' decisions to warn. This fear has generated
several specific effects upon clinical practice. As a result of
Tarasoff, therapists (1) are more inclined to discuss dangerousness
with their patients, (2) focus more often on their patients' less
serious threats, (3) are more inclined to consult with other
professionals when involved with potentially dangerous patients,
and (4) have changed the manner in which they keep their records.
The resultant effects demonstrate the continuing influence Tarasoff
has had on psychotherapeutic practice in the eleven years since the
decision.
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We are studying the effects of the California Supreme Court's
decision in Tarasoff v. The Regents of the University of California,
17 Cal. 3d 425 (1976) on mental health practitioners.
Eight years ago, the Stanford Law Review published a similar
study shortly after the Court decided Tarasoff. Now that the
decision is well beyond its infancy, we want to understand whether
and in what ways Tarasoff has influenced the practice of
psychology and psychiatry.
We are distributing the enclosed questionnaire to psychologists
and psychiatrists licensed in the State of California. Please
complete the questionnaire and return it in the self-addressed,
stamped envelope as soon as possible.
This survey is absolutely confidential. If you have any
questions or comments, feel free to contact us at (415) 969-8937
or (415) 723-3502.
We depend upon your cooperation to insure the reliability of
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()not a clinical practitioner.
If you are not a clinical practitioner, please stop here and return the
questionnaire.
2. How long have you been practicing?
()0-5 years ( ) 6-10 years ( ) 11-15 years
(16-20 years ( ) greater than 20 years
3. Are you in private practice?
() Yes () No
3a. If yes, what proportion of your professional time is spent in private
practice?
()None () 1-20% (21-40% (41-60% (61-80%
(81-99% () 100%
4. Are you affiliated with a: [check all that apply]
()private hospital ( ) public hospital
()correctional facility ( ) primary or secondary school
()university ( ) no affiliation ( ) other
5. How many patients do you see per year?
(None 1-5 ()6-10 () 11-20()21-30
()31-50 () 51-75 (76-100 () 101-150
()greater than 150
6. Have you heard of the Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California
case? ( ) Yes () No
7. How did you hear of the Tarasoff decision?
()colleagues ( ) professional association
()attorney ( ) professional journals ()school () media()other
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8. To whom do you think the Tarasoff decision applies? [check all that apply]
()psychiatrists ( ) clinical psychologists
()clinical social workers ( ) marriage and family counselors
()clergymen and religious counselors
()lawyers ( ) other
9. To what type of threat does Tarasoff apply? [check all that apply]
()threat of physical injury ( ) threat of homicide
()threat of property damage () threat of suicide
()other
9a. What interventions does Tarasoff require?
()warning potential victims
()warning guardian, family, or friends
()informing the police
()using reasonable care to protect the victim
()involuntary commitment of patient
()notification of superiors or administrators
()consultation with colleagues
10. In which situation does Tarasoff and its progeny apply?
() where a specific individual is threatened
() where a threat had been made, but no specific individual has been
threatened
() where the victim is readily identifiable
11. Does Tarasoff apply to unarticulated threats?
() Yes () No
12. Are you familiar with California Civil Code Section 43.92 (1985) which
codifies the Tarasoff decision?
() Yes () No
12a. If yes, who must be warned? [check all that apply]
()the potential victim
()a potential suicide victim's family
()any victim's family
()the police
13. Tarasoff and its progeny applies to: [please check one]
() only those threats that have a high likelihood of being carried out
() threats which are somewhat likely to be carried out
() threats in which you are unable to determine this likelihood
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14. How important to successful therapy is absolute confidentiality between
patient and therapist?
() essential, should never be breached under any circumstances
() important, but may be breached under certain circumstances
() unimportant, of marginal value
15. Do you discuss confidentiality with your patients?
( ) always ( ) sometimes ( ) never
16. In light of Tarasoff, do you discuss with your patients the possibility that
you might be obliged to contact third parties as a result of something said
in therapy?
() always () almost always () sometimes () never
17. Under what circumstances do you discuss the possibility of having to breach
a patient's confidentiality? [check all that apply]
()as a general practice at the outset of therapy
()as a general practice during therapy, but not at the outset
()only if a patient asks directly
()when a patient threatens violence
17a. If you do inform patients of your potential Tarasoff obligation, do
you do so
()through discussion with the patient?
()by written document?
()by another method?
18. Do you discuss your Tarasoff obligations with [check all that apply]
()all of your patients
()those whom you perceive as dangerous
()those whom you perceive as suicidal
()no patients
19. Once your patients become aware that you might discuss their case with a
third party, do they seem reluctant to divulge certain information to you?
() Yes () Yes, somewhat () No
20. Have you ever felt you lost a patient because he/she feared a breach of
confidentiality?
() Yes () No
20a. If yes, how many patients?
( ) 0-2 ( ) 3-6 ( ) 7-10 () 11-15 ()more than 15
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21. Since Tarasoff have you counseled a potentially dangerous patient?
() Yes () No
22. How many patients do you see per year whom you consider to be potentially
dangerous?
( )None ( 1-2 ( )3-5 ( )6-8 ( )9-15
( ) 16-25 ( ) 25+
23. Do you avoid counseling patients whom you consider to be potentially
dangerous?
() Yes () No
23a. If you avoid these patients, why? [check all that apply]
()fear of Tarasoff liability
()in part, due to fear of Tarasoff liability
()it's difficult work
()fear for personal safety()other






25. Since Tarasoff (1976) have you ever warned a potential victim of a patient's
threats?
( ) Yes; if so, how many times? _ ()No
26. If you have warned a potential victim, what factors have influenced your
decision to warn? [check all that apply]
()potential liability from the Tarasoff decision
()potential liability under Cal. Civ. Code Section 43.92
()concern for the potential victim
()other
26a. What has been the primary influence upon your decision to warn?
[check only one]
()potential liability from the Tarasoff decision
()potential liability under Cal. Civil Code § 43.92
()concern for the potential victim()other
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27. Since Tarasoff have you ever warned a family of a patient's danger to
himself/herself?
() Yes; if so, how many times? _ ()No
28. If you have warned a patient's family, what factors have influenced your
decision to warn?
()potential liability from the Tarasoff decision
()potential liability under Cal. Civ. Code § 43.92
()concern for the patient
(other
28a. What is the primary influence upon your decision to warn? [check
only one]
()potential liability from the Tarasoff decision
()potential liability under Cal. Civ. Code § 43.92
()concern for the patient()other
29. Since Tarasoff, have you ever notified the police of a patient's danger to self
or others?
() Yes; if so, how many times? - () No
30. If you have notified the police, what factors have influenced your decision
to notify?
()potential liability from the Tarasoff decision
()otential liability under Cal. Civ. Code § 43.92
()oncern for the patient or potential victim()other
30a. What is the primary influence upon your decision to warn? [check
all that apply]
()potential liability from the Tarasoff decision
()potential liability under Cal. Civ. Code § 43.92
()oncern for the potential victim
()plans to detain patients on a 72-hour hold
()other
1230
1993 / Ripple Effects of Tarasoff
31. Have you refrained from warning a potential victim when you thought
Tarasoff applied? () Yes () No




()notified the patient's family
C) feared lawsuit for breach of confidentiality
32. Has the Tarasoff decision had any of these specific effects on your practice?
[check all that apply]
() increased your contacts with other mental health professionals when you
are involved with a dangerous patient
() decreased your contacts with other mental health professionals when
you are involved with a dangerous patient
C) led you to focus more often on dangerousness with your patients
() led you to focus less often on dangerousness with your patients
C) led you to focus more often on dangerousness at the expense of
exploring other issues with your patients
C) led you to focus more frequently on less serious threats by your patients
() led you to alert more patients that circumstances could arise in which
you would be obliged to speak to someone outside the clinical setting
about the patient
C) led you to keep more detailed records
C) led you to keep less detailed records
() increased your fear of lawsuits
33. Have you ever been sued for failing to warn under Tarasoff?
() Yes; if yes, how many times? _ ( ) No
34. If there were no obligation to warn under the Tarasoff decision or Cal. Civ.
Code § 43.92, would you warn a potential victim?
( ) Yes ( ) No ( ) Depends on the circumstances
35. Would you disclose to a sexual partner or a potential sexual partner of one
of your patients that the patient has contracted the A.I.D.S. virus?
( ) Yes ( ) No ( ) Depends on the circumstances
36. What is your age?
( ) 22-30 ( ) 31-37 () 38-47 )48-56 () 57-65 () 66+
37. Sex: () Male () Female
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38. What is your gross annual income? (in thousands)
()less than 20 ( ) 20-40 ) 41-60 () 61-80
()81-100 ( ) 101-150 () 151-200 () 201-300
()greater than 300
Thank you for your participation.
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